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Cannibalization of any system is defined as replacing a defective part or 
component of one system with an in-use part or component from another system. 
Cannibalizations are an integral part of high tempo operations where aircraft and weapon 
systems fail and must be repaired on the spot and immediately deployed. However, there 
has been an every increasing reliance on cannibalizations in some aviation communities 
over the past three years. ,Cannibalizations have several undesirable affects on a system 
for several reasons. First, they triple the work of maintenance personnel, due to 
switching parts with another aircraft, in essence impairing an aircraft and repairing both 
aircraft to complete a single m~intenance action. Second, removing parts multiple times 
between aircraft while conducting cannibalizations reduces the reliability of parts. Third, 
improper or lack of documentation of cannibalizations underreports the severity of the 
problem and hides inefficiencies. New innovative practices and techniques to improve 
the documentation of cannibalizations and reduce the total number of cannibalizations 
that occur are needed. 
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The Purpose of this thesis is to determine the primary 
causes that lead to cannibalization of the EA-6B aircraft. 
According to most maintenance personnel, at the operational, 
intermediate and depot levels, the cause of cannibalization 
is the lack of parts in the supply system. However, the 
lack of parts in the supply pipeline is a symptom of the 
problem not the root cause. A lack of parts is usually the 
result of poor logistics support planning (i.e. less than 
100 percent funding and purchase of required spare parts), 
increased usage of the system, or higher than predicted 
failure rates of parts and components. This thesis 
determines the root causes of cannibalizations for the EA-6B 
aircraft, by examining data on cannibalized parts and 
components and by analyzing the causal factors leading up to 
today's current cannibalization problem with the EA-6B 
aircraft. 
This thesis also examines current attitudes towards 
cannibalizations from several perspectives including 
maintenance personnel at the squadron, Class desk at the 
1 
Type Commander, the Supply Support IPT, the wing readiness 
division, and the Program Manager. My goal is to discover 
different for the Navy to improve supportability of the EA-
6B aircraft and to improve documentation of 
cannibalizations. Better documentation will bring to light 
the scope of the problems with cannibalizations. This along 




Cannibalization in'Naval Aviation refers to the 
physical removal of serviceable parts or components from one 
aircraft for installation on another aircraft. 
Cannibalizations are often performed in preparation of and 
during high-tempo operations, scheduled training missions 
where aircraft and weapon systems must be repaired on the 
spot and immediately deployed. Cannibalizations also occur 
to get as many aircraft to full mission capable status, 
which improves the readiness of the organization. In the 
aviation world, the urgency to meet operational commitments 
is frequently the determining factor to cannibalize. 
2 
Cannibalizations cause dramatic reductions in system 
maintainability and inherent reliability because unnecessary 
maintenance is being performed on aircraft, which can result 
in increased damage to components, increased probability of 
errors, and higher opportunity cost in maintenance labor 
hours. There is a lack of documentation on the parts being 
swapped and the number of hours that part has been in 
service. This results in increased failure rates and 
unreliability.of the system. ' However, there has been an 
every increasing reliance on cannibalizations in several 
aviation communities over the past three years. I will 
present data that will show the increased reliance on 
cannibalizations and discuss the difficulties that exist in 
properly documenting cannibalizations. 
The EA-6B community relies heavily on cannibalization 
to accomplish its assigned mission and to maintain the 
required operational availability of its aircraft. 
Cannibalization actions are becoming the first solution to 
repairing an aircraft instead of the last resort. 
Cannibalizations have increased at all levels of repair and 
maintenance for the EA-6B Prowler, causing the manager of 
the program to take a closer look at cannibalizations. 
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2. EA-6B Aircraft Yesterday and Today 
The EA-6B Prowler is a radar-jamming attack aircraft 
that was specifically designed and built for tactical 
electronic warfare. The Prowler, a derivative of the two-
place A-6 Intruder, was lengthened to accommodate a four-
place cockpit. The EA-6B replaced the A-3 Skywarrior. The 
EA-6A (the predecessor of the EA-6B) was first designed in 
1966. The first EA-6B was fielded in 1971 and the last one 
produced was 1991. The established operational life of the 
aircraft was 20 years, and has since been extended until 
2015. 
There are 124 EA-6B aircraft operating in today's Navy 
and Marine Cor~~. There are 20 EA-6B squadrons. The average 
EA-6B squadron has four aircraft. The RAG training squadrons 
have three aircraft as of August 1998. There are 
approximately 40 EA-6Bs in Standard Depot Level Maintenance 
(SDLM) at Naval Aviation Depot (NADEP) Jacksonville, FL. 
The Marine Corps has four squadrons for a total of 17 
aircraft located at Cherry Point, NC. The Naval Reserves 
have one squadron of four aircraft located at Andrews Air 
Force Base. The EA-6B also assumed the Airforce's mission 
af~er the retirement of the EF-111. This has greatly 
increased the mission requirements on an aging airframe. 
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NADEP Jacksonville overseas in-service engineering, 
logistics support, modification support, SDLM, conversions, 
and technical bulletins for the EA-6B aircraft. The level I 
and level II IPT leaders for logistic support are also 
located in Jacksonville. The Program Manager, the Deputy 
Program Manager, and the Assistant Program Managers for 
Logistics, Systems Engineering, Avionics Program Office, 
Business/Financial, Training systems, Program Integration, 
Contracts, Legal, and Structure and Flying Qualities are 
-located at the Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR). 
As expected with the aging of any system, reliability 
of parts has decreased, failures and maintenance costs have 
increased, and availability of critical parts is extremely 
low. The low availability of parts has resulted in an 
increased level of cannibalizations. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The primary research question this thesis is: 
What are the root causes of cannibalizations for the EA-6B 
aircraft? 
Secondary research questions include: 
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Has the actual number of cannibalizations increased over the 
past three years or is the increase the result of better 
documentation? 
What Impact does cannibalizations have on squadron or Type 
class readiness? 
What are the consequences faced by maintenance personnel and 
Commanding Officers if cannibalization practices are 
abandoned? 
What techniques and incentives can be introduced to improve 
supportability of the EA-6B aircraft? 
What can the Navy do to improve documentation of 
cannibalizations? 
How can the Navy improve logistics support to minimize the 
need for cannibalization? 
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D. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS AND METHODOLOGY 
This thesis presents eight years of general data and 
three years of specific data. The main focus of this study 
however, will be on the past three years, to determine root 
causes of cannibalization of the EA-6B. I specifically 
reviewed data on parts and components that had the highest 
rates of cannibalizations. Currently maintenance personnel 
at the depot are cannibalizing nose and main landing gear 
and flight control surfaces at a very high rate. I will 
determine if there really is a lack of spare parts in the 
supply system. If so, is it a problem caused by a poor Post 
Production Support Plan, a higher- increase in the number of 
aircraft requiring depot maintenance, or is previous parts 
demand too low for industry to maintain a sufficient number 
of spares? Or is the problem insufficient funding for the 
program. 
This thesis focuses on a small cross section of parts 
to determine the cause, and then apply the results of the 
analysis to the remaining parts and components of the EA-6B. 
The software used in this thesis is Microsoft office version 
, 97. 
The Methodology used in this research consisted of a 
literature review of previous thesis on the topic of 
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cannibalizations, briefs from the Program Managers Logistics 
Support IPT, and a review of instructions and other 
guidelines on readiness and cannibalization. Concepts were 
borrowed from books that cover the topic of logistics 
support for acquisition systems, DoD acquisition 
instructions, and from DoD Acquisition Deskbook. 
The author reviewed the data from the Aviation 
Maintenance Readiness Reports (AMRR), Aviation Support 
Management Reports (ASMR), Naval Aviation Logistics Data 
Analysis (NALDA) reports, and NALCOMIS. Commander, Naval 
Aviation Pacific Fleet (COMNAVAIRPAC) Analysis Division 
provided data extracted from NALDA on cannibalization per 
100 flight hours by quarter, and other data and 
correspondence on cannibalization. The Program Managers 
Supply Support IPT provided data on parts status and 
problems with EA-68s going through SDLM, and Block 82 to 89 
modification. COMVAQWINGPAC provided a list of parts 
cannibalized for operational and deployed aircraft in fiscal 
year 1998, 
This thesis presents NALDA data obtained from 
COMNAVAIRPAC, COMVAQWINGPAC, and the EA-68 Supply Support 
IPT from Jacksonville FL on EA-68 cannibalizations and parts 
degraders. Significant points from the data are presented, 
and an analysis is conducted. The analysis is based on the 
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information I have received through telephone and personal 
interviews, documents that I have read discussing the 
cannibalization problem, and the concepts that I have 
learned from various classes on providing proper logistic 
support for the entire life cycle of a system. This 
analysis provides the reader better insight into the actual 
problem. 
The interviews conducted wer~ both telephone and face 
to face interviews with the COMNAVAIRPAC's Class Desk and 
Analysis Division personnel, the Program Manager's Supply 
Support IPT Leader, COMVAQWINGPAC's maintenance personnel, 
and Logisticians at Naval Inventory Control Point, and 
Defense Logistics Agency. I incorporated the thoughts and 
ideas from the personnel who perform maintenance'and provide 
support to the aircraft, with the Logistics Engineering, and 
Strategic Logistics concepts to develop solutions to 
increase the documentation of cannibalization, reduce the 
total number of cannibalizations, and improve the 
supportability of the EA-6B. 
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II. FACTORS LEADING UP TO MAINTAINABILITY PROBLEMS 
A. PROBLEMS IN THE EA-6B COMMUNITY 
Denise Machala, the Supply Support Integrated Product 
Team Leader for the EA-6B program stated, ~ The EA-6B 
community of 124 aircraft has been surviving on 
cannibalizations for the past two years". According to Ms. 
Machala, the EA-6B has used a high number of parts from 
retired A-6E airframes. Parts and components from aircraft 
newly inducted into the depot for Standard Depot Level 
Maintenance (SDLM) and block 89 modifications are also being 
robbed to get aircraft near the completion of SDLM fully 
operational to return to the fleet. 
The components most commonly cannibalized parts are the 
flight control surfaces (i.e. slats, flaps, rudders, nose 
radomes) and landing gear. As previously stated in chapter 
one, the lack of spare parts is a symptom of a 'systemic 
problem that has lead to the high rate of cannibalizations. 
Through my research, I have found several possible root 
causes that created today's situation with EA-6B parts and 
components shortages. 
Those possible causes are as follows. (1) The last EA-
6B produced by Grumman was delivered to the Navy in July 
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1991. However, the Postproduction Support Plan was not 
developed until 1992. (2) The demand on the aircraft has 
increased due to the' service life being extended until 2015, 
and the EA-68 assumed the Airforce's mission for the EF-111, 
which was retired in 1996. (3) The closure of NADEP Alameda 
and Norfolk greatly increased the workload of NADEP 
Jacksonville. This, coupled with the poor turnover from 
Alameda and Norfolk NADEPS to Jacksonville, severely 
backlogged depot maintenance in fiscal year 1995. (4) The 
Aircraft Service Period Adjustment (ASPA) program delayed 
the number of aircraft inducted into SDLM for scheduled 
maintenance from 1983, the beginning of this program, until 
the present. (5) 30 to 50 percent of the cannibalizations in 
the fleet are for convenience. The parts are in the system, 
but the maintenance personnel decide that it is easier or 
faster to pull the needed parts or components from another 
aircraft. 
We will. now discuss each point and show how these 
actions adversely impacted the EA-68 .program and helped to 
create the cannibalization problem the program is 
experiencing today. 
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B. LACK OF POST PRODUCTION SUPPORT PLAN 
Grumman Aerospace corporation delivered the last EA-6B 
to the Navy on July 29, 1991. In accordance with DoD 
5000.2-R (Mandatory Procedures for Major Defense Acquisition 
Programs) part 7 and MIL-STD-1388-1, the Postproduction 
Support (PPS) plan should be mature by milestone III in the 
acquisition cycle and completed by the end of production. 
The Assistant Program Manager of Logistics is responsible 
for the PPS plan as well as all logistic support. According 
to RADM (ret.) Donald Eaton, the Material Logistics Academic 
Associate Advisor at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey 
CA, the PPS plan for the EA-6B was not developed until 1992, 
one year after production ended. 
This is an important point, because the PPS plan is a 
vital element in overall integrated logistics support. It 
ensures continued readiness and proper logistics support 
throughout the life of the program, with a focus on 
continued support after production. MIL-STD-1388-1 
constitutes the basic standard for Logistic Support Analysis 
(LSA). The LSA is an analytical process by which the 
Logistics Support necessary for a product is defined. 
Included in the LSA are requirements for supply support, 
maintenance planning, test and support equipment, 
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transportation and handling, personnel and training, 
facilities, data, and software. The LSA is developed by the 
contractor and encompasses 15 specific tasks. One of the 15 
tasks is constructing the PPS plan. The PPS plan is 
developed using support requirements and concepts that are 
the result of the PPS analysis, which is task 403 of the 
LSA. Elements of the PPS plan include: 
Designating engineering authority 
- Determining sparing levels of parts 
- Determining the depot that will be the center for post 
production support 
Determining repair parts needed throughout the life of 
the program 
Determining level of responsibility for maintenance and 
technical support 
Establishing requirements for a smart shutdown 
Maintaining a know~edge base (artisans, data, tooling) 
Determining facility requirements 
All the above aspects should be considered prior to 
shutting down the production line of an aircraft. Failure 
to do so can result in: a shortage of parts with no contract 
in place to procure needed parts and components, high cost 
to DoD to modify antiquated equipment with new technology, 
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untimely and costly aircraft maintenance, inadequate support 
equipment and facilities, and funding shortfalls in the out-
years. 
Program management officials of the EA-6B (which 
include the contractor) did not develop contingencies for 
possible future problems. In-depth re-engineering near the 
end of the aircraft's original life cycle, production 
restart for piece ,parts and components, extension of the 
aircraft service life, changes in the depot level support 
facilities, or the buy-out of the prime contractor should 
have been planned for. All of the aforementioned events 
occurred with the EA-6B program. Not having a PPS plan in 
place compounded the probl,ems. 
C. EXTENDING OPERATIONAL LIFE AND INCREASED MISSION 
In 1996, the Airforce retired the EF-111. It was 
decided that the EA:-6B would assume a joint role and the 
mission of the EF-111. According to Ms. Machala the EA-6B 
program received additional funding for upgrades to bring 
aciqitional 24 aircraft into active service, but did not 
an 
receive funding for the increased maintenance resulting from 
additional flying requirements. Prior to assuming the joint 
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role, the Primary Aircraft Availability (PAA) was 80 
aircraft. This means that 80 out of the 124 aircraft must 
be fully operational to meet mission requirements. The 
increase in mission scope resulted in an increase of the PAA 
from 80 to 104 aircraft in 1996. 
This additional requirement put an already backlogged 
NADEP Jacksonville, further behind the power curve since it 
had not stabilized from the additional workload brought 
about by the closures of NADEPs Alameda and Norfolk. As of 
31 August 1998 only 84 of the 124 aircraft were operational. 
This is considerably short of the 104 aircraft required to 
meet current PAA. 
Figure 1.1 is the August 31, 1998 Aircraft 
Configuration and Location Chart for the EA-6B. The chart 
lists aircraft by identification number and by where they 
are assigned. This chart shows 84 aircraft assigned to the 
fleet and 40 aircraft located in Jacksonville undergoing 
various levels of maintenance and modifications. 45 
aircraft have been stricken because they were prototypes and 
test platforms during the development of the aircraft. 
Due to the increased mission requirements and the 
reality that no other aircraft in DoD's inventory has the 
capability of the EA-6B, the aircraft's operational service 
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life has been extended until 2015. This extension of 
service life and increase in PAA has caused logistic support 
to lag behind. The service life extension also brought along 
with it a new problem, tired iron. Tired iron occurs when 
the metal flight control surfaces and wings are stressed 
during normal operations for many years. The surface 
components become extremely weak, and the honeycomb 
structures inside. the aircraft wing begin to breakdown. 
The Navy supply system is currently playing catch-up; 
to provide needed parts to the EA-6B program. Key players 
in the supply system are Naval Inventory control Point 
(NAVICP) and Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). NAVICP is 
responsible for provisioriing components and managing end 
items (components) for the EA-6B. NAVICP also determines 
the SDLM induction rate of the aircraft based on predicted 
maintenance demand requirements and projected funding 
levels. DLA is responsible for managing piece parts to 
support the end items and also manages consumable supplies 
for the aircraft. NAVICP, DLA and, NAVAIR are finally 
working together to correct the current parts shortage 
problem. This situation may have been avoided, or at least 
th~ severity of the situation reduced, if a PPS plan had 
been established and the supply system had been involved 
from the beginning. 
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Although early supply integration and an effective PPS 
plan would not have changed the need to extend the program, 
contingency plans could have been developed to evaluate the 
probability of extending the program for an additional 10 -
20 years prior to the end of production. Also plans to 
conduct a smart shutdown of the production line and make 
modifications to the aircraft with new technology could have 
enabled the acquisition community and the supply system to 
react faster to the changing requirements. The cost to DoD 
to fund the restart of parts production and to refurbish 
older aircraft would have been much less. 
D. CLOSURE OF NADEPS ALAMEDA AND NORFOLK 
During the 1994 BRAC hearings, which were conducted to 
reduce the Navy's infrastructure, the Naval Depots were one 
of the prime targets for reductions. NADEP Alameda and 
Norfolk were selected along with NADEP Pensacola for 
decommissioning to reduce the number of NADEPs from six to 
three. Of the three remaining NADEPs located in Cherry 
,Point NC, Jacksonville FL, and San Diego CA, NADEP 
Jacksonville was selected as the repair depot for the EA-6B. 
Once it was determined that Jacksonville would inherit 
all depot level maintenance for the aircraft, a plan was 
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developed to ensure a seamless transfer of functions from 
the closing Alameda and Norfolk NADEPs to the gaining 
Jacksonville. The plan consisted of a face to face turnover 
between functional positions between each NADEP. The plan 
also included an orderly identification of aircraft parts 
and components, documentation of incomplete maintenance 
actions, current sparing levels of parts and components, and 
a gradual shutdown of the closing activity coupled with an 
immediate startup of mai~tenance for the gaining activity. 
Unfortunately, this transition was not executed as 
planned. Once Alameda and Norfolk NADEPs were designated 
for BRAe closure, NADEP personnel began their departure 
sooner than anticipated. This early exodus not only caused 
management to scrap the plan of an orderly and seamless 
transfer of functions from Alameda and Norfolk, but also 
caused a backlog of 1995 scheduled maintenance. The 
transition took more than two years to complete. One example 
was the transfer of landing gear components, which started 
in 1995 and was not completed until 1997. 
One reason for the backlog was that NADEP Jacksonville 
required new tooling to have the capability to perform the 
proper maintenance on the EA-6B. New tooling was not 
purchased and installed prior to Jacksonville assuming 
responsibility for maintenance of the aircraft. Second, 
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there were incomplete specifications of maintenance and 
repairs that were to be performed for each aircraft. 
Existing work processes and operations established at the 
NADEPs were based on repair manuals received from the 
contractor. 
However, the technical manuals did not fully address 
the severely degraded material condition of the landing gear 
and some of the flight control surfaces. Therefore, the 
nonstandard processes required supplemental specifications 
in the form of a local Temporary Engineering Instruction 
(TEl). The local TEl had to be developed for Jacksonville, 
which also delayed the startup of EA-6B maintenance and 
added to the backlog. This increased the average time for 
an aircraft to complete SDLM from nine months to·13 months. 
Storage was also an unforeseen nightmare, because the 
Navy had parts and components pouring from Alameda and 
Norfolk into the limited storage facilities managed by NADEP 
Jacksonville and DLA. Not only were there EA-6B spare 
parts, but there were many cannibalized parts from the 
retired A6-Es (mainly flight control surfaces and wings) 
going to NADEP Jacksonville. The result of failing to 
identify storage problems early resulted in many aircraft 
components critical to the EA-6B being stored outside with 
no protection from the weather. 
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Many of the components were in some type of container 
mostly wooden crates. Unfortunately most of the crates were 
in extremely poor condition, e.g., crushed with sections 
missing, or extremely water logged. Solid crates containing 
heavy component were stacked on top of partial crates, many 
saturated by the rain, which added weight to the partial 
container. In many cases, the components were crushed or 
extremely damaged, requiring a large expenditure of man-
hours to restore. 
This storage problem was not fully discovered until 
June 1997, which meant that some parts had been sitting 
out exposed to the elements for over a year. Literally, 
hundreds of EA-6B aircraft components, many with a high 
fleet demand, were being permanently stored outside of a 
storage facility. 
Appendix A contains an excerpt from an evaluation 
conducted by the Supply Support IPT of the FE components 
that were discovered in open storage in June 1997. This 
document was submitted to NAVAIR and NAVICP in the form 
of an NADEP Jacksonville Vision Employee idea titled 
"Summary of On-si te Evaluation of EA-6B Components". 
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Each component was identified by the part number 
provided on the identification plate, serial number (when 
available), material 'condition, and packaging condition. 
A large number of the components evaluated were 
misidentified. In most of these cases, the National 
Stock Numbers on the packages did not correspond to the 
part numbers of the component inside. When shipping 
documentati'on was available, it was found that the item 
had been turned into supply as a higher-grade 
configuration. 
For example, a flap with a part number of 
128CS10006-5 would be identified on the crate and 
shipping documentation as a 128CS10006-7 flap, the latter 
of which would have modifications that would make that 
component a more desirable asset to receive in exchange 
for the older configuration. This problem was observed 
on most components with newer configurations in supply. 
Many of the misidentified horizontal stabilizers were 
found to be of an obsolete configuration. 
The majority of the components were given a 
material-condition classification of either Category 3 or 
Category 4. Very few were identified as Category 1. 
Some of those found to be in a Category 1 material 
condition were originally A-condition items that had been 
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erroneously identified as F-condition assets (material is 
generally un-repairable or the repair effort is greater 
than the replacement cost). However, the material 
condition of these had deteriorated due to exposure to 
weather and could no longer be considered Ready for Issue 
(RFI) assets. Components for which there were very few 
assets in existence were categorized as 3's even though a 
re-manufacturing ~ffort would be required to restore the 
component to an RFI condition,. All obsolete components 
were designated as Category.4's. 
In summary, the decision to close Norfolk and 
Alameda and relocation all EA-6B depot maintenance to 
Jacksonville, FL and close NADEP Norfolk was a 
congressional political decision. In 1993 the year 
preceding the BRAC hearings, NADEP Norfolk was rated as 
the most efficient NADEP. The transition to NADEP 
Jacksonville was not thoroughly planned out and was not 
properly executed, thus causing the severe problems 
described above. A lot of time, money and valuable 
resources were wasted due to poor planning and 
implementation of this strategy. This event was a main 
contributor if not the primary culprit to the problems 
the EA-6B program is having today. 
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D. EFFECTS OF THE ASPA PROGRAM 
In an effort to reduce the cost of SDLM per aircraft, 
the Navy initiated a new depot induction policy in 1983. 
This new policy was the Aircraft Service Period Adjustment 
(ASPA) program developed by the Naval Aviation Logistics 
Center (NALC) at Patuxent River, Maryland. The ASPA program 
developed a process to inspect aircraft prior to induction 
into regularly scheduled SDLM. The ASPA inspection would 
determine if it were necessary to induct an aircraft into. 
SDLM. 
In 1982, the NALC observed that many of the aircraft 
being inducted into the. depots for SDLM were new aircraft 
that had limited wear. Many of these aircraft were newly 
delivered to the Navy, and reflected limited use. Aircraft 
in a high operational tempo wear faster than aircraft that 
are going through test and evaluation. Therefore, NALC 
believed some of the maintenance and component replacements 
performed on these aircraft were unnecessary. 
The ASPA process started with an inspection scheduled 
at the end of the aircraft's Operating Service Period (OSP). 
The inspection would determine whether an airplane could be 
extended for one year or should be inducted into the depot 
as scheduled. The squadrons would prepare the plane and 
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NADEP personnel would conduct the inspection and determine 
if the aircraft was a candidate for being waived from 
induction into the depot. The ASPA program was approved in 
1983 by NAVAIR. In that year, depot inductions were reduced 
from 720 to 420 airplanes and achieved a one-time savings of 
$300 million Navy wide as reported by the Navy Material 
Command. 
In th~ long run, the ASPA program had several adverse 
effects on EA-6B program. First, it made it difficult for 
the NADEPs to properly plan work for depot personnel because 
fewer aircraft were inducted than were scheduled. Second, 
lack of regularly scheduled maintenance falsely reduced the 
demand for parts from the supply system resulting in 
inadequate stocking levels of spare parts. Third, it was 
not uncommon to extend an aircraft for three to five years, 
increasing the number of problems each airplane had when 
they arrived to the NADEP. This introduced randomness to 
the process. Fourth, as a result of delay inductions 
incipient failures areas were undetected which lead to major 
degradation of components (i.e. landing gear problems not 
discovered until failures occurred during operations. 
Fifth, ASAP lengthened the amount of time required for an 
aircraft to complete SDLM, because the depot had to inspect 
the aircraft to identify problems before they could order 
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the needed parts. The problems one aircraft had were 
different from the next aircraft that was inducted. With 
the ASPA program, Standard Depot Level Maintenance was no 
longer standard. Long lead times were required to procure 
needed parts to complete maintenance on aircraft. This 
resulted in depots cannibalizing new inductees to get 
aircraft near the completion of SDLM back out to the fleet. 
The bottom l~ne is that the ASPA program did realize a 
$300 million saving in 1983 for the reduction the number of 
aircraft going through SDLM by 300 aircraft with an average 
SDLM cost of one mitlion dollars each. ASPA started a 
vicious cycle that reduced the stocking level of spare parts 
due to low demand data, and increased the reliance of 
cannibalizations to get fully operational aircraft to the 
fleet. 
E. CANNIBALIZING FOR CONVENIENCE 
According to Commander Michael Hardee, the Aircraft 
Programs and Policy Officer for COMNAVAIRPAC, 50 percent of 
fleet cannibalizations are performed for convenience. Half 
of 'the time, parts are in stock at the local Fleet 
Industrial Supply Center or onboard the carrier. When 
maintenance personnel are under great pressure to get an 
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aircraft ready for launch, it takes too long to go through 
the established channels to obtain the part or component. 
Also cannibalization does not occur the same way every time. 
Therefore, it is quite difficult to detect and is often 
underreported. 
Below are two examples of how cannibalizations can 
occur. The first example is a by-the-book step-by-step 
cannibalization process, which is outlined in OPNAV 
Instruction 4790.2G. The second example demonstrates how 
fleet cannibalizations really occur (not by the book). Both 
examples will show why maintenance personnel rely on 
cannibalizing rather than going through established supply 
channels, and why it is difficult to fully document. 
Scenario One: There are two aircraft. Aircraft 105 is 
in the hanger awaiting parts (not mission capable) and 
aircraft 107 is scheduled for the next launch. Aircraft 107 
goes down for system failure, and'a Maintenance Action Form 
(MAF) is initiated by the maintenance personnel (this form 
must be initiated prior to any work occurring to an 
aircraft, according to current regulations). The work 
center trouble-shoots the system, discovers the faulty 
component and places the component on order. Maintenance 
Control verifies the component with the Material Control 
division and performs a stock check via NALCOMIS. Material 
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Control notifies Maintenance Control that the part is not in 
stock (NIS). Maintenance Control approves the 
cannibalization of the component from aircraft 105. The 
cannibalization of the component is initiated with a 
cannibalization MAF (a separate MAF is required for all 
cannibalizations). NALCOMIS assigns code 814 to process and 
document the swap of the component. The work center removes 
the component fro~ aircraft 105, and then installs it onto 
aircraft 107. The original MAF for aircraft 107 is signed 
off and closed out. The second MAF remains open for aircraft 
105 to receive the component originally ordered for aircraft 
107. 
Scenario Two: Aircraft 107 is on next go for launch. 
Aircraft 107 goes down for a system failure. The work center 
finds the faulty component. Aircraft 105 is parked next to 
107 with a good component and it is not scheduled to fly. 
The component is cannibalized from 105 and placed in 107. 
Aircraft 107 checked well, and is launched. The work center 
calls Maintenance Control to report the repair to 107 and 
the cannibalization of a component from aircraft 105. At 
this time, there has been no documentation of maintenance on 
either aircraft. Maintenance Control generates and signs 
off the system malfunction MAF for aircraft 107. When time 
permits, Maintenance Control orders a component under a 
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separate MAF for aircraft 105. Cannibalization of the 
component has occurred but is never documented. 
Several other versions similar to this can occur where 
parts are pulled off the hanger aircraft the day prior to a 
launch just in case an aircraft goes down, or parts that 
arrive for a hanger aircraft are diverted to aircraft 
scheduled for a launch. Often these actions are never 
reported as a can~ibalization.Urgency to launch an 
aircraft that may be minutes behind its original launch time 
drives cannibalization. It is difficult to document all 
cannibalizations because a separate MAF is required for a 
cannibalization action, which doubles the administrative 
load of maintenance pers6~nel for a single maintenance 
action. Maintenance personnel rarely have enough time to 
complete repairs for aircraft to make scheduled launches, 
therefore reducing the probability of completing 
documentation for cannibalizations. 
This why ~IRPAC's Policy Analysis Division believes 50 
percent of the fleet cannibalizations are for convenience, 
and that less than half of the actual fleet cannibalizations 
are documented. CDR Hardee stated that one Maintenance 
Control Officer ordered over 700 cannibalization actions in 
one deployment. However, less than 250 cannibalizations 
were actually documented. 
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The operational tempo demands immediate fixes to 
problems that impede timely launch and using the proper 
channels reduces timeliness. One of the ways Carrier and 
Squadron Commanding Officers are graded for effectiveness of 
command is by the completion rates of scheduled sorties for 
the day. Frequent misses of scheduled launches can 
negatively affect the command and draw unwanted scrutiny 
from Group Commanders of carrier flight operations and 
operational maintenance procedures. 
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III. ANALYSIS OF EA-6B CANNIBALIZATION DATA 
A. CANNIBALIZATIONS PER 100 FLIGHT HOURS NAVY WIDE 
Cannibalizations are usually measured in ,one of two 
ways: the number of cannibalizations per 100 flight hours, 
and the total number'of items cannibalized in a specified 
period of time (i.e. cannibalizations per month', quarter or 
year) . 
Table 3.1 was obtained from COMNAVAIRPAC's Analysis 
Division covering a period from 1990 to 1998 for all 
aircraft Navy'wide. This data contains cannibalizations per 
100 flight hours. The 1998 statistics show first through the 
third quarter data only (fourth quarter data was not 
available) . 
In examining the data, it is clear ,that the number of 
reported cannibalizations for naval aviation decreased from 
1990 - 1995 from 10.4 to 8.4, the lowest levels in over 15 
years according to COMNAVAIRPAC's Plans and Policies 
Officer. For example, every 100 hours that an aircraft is 
operating, 8.4 cannibalizations occur on average. 
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Cannibalizations Per 100 Flight 
Hours Per Model Series 
7.4 
Source: NAMSO 4790-17049-01 DTD 210798 
7.0 6.3 
Table 3.1 Cannibalizations Per 100 Flight Hours 
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From fiscal year 1996 through 1998 cannibalizations per 
100 flight hours appears to have a slight ascending 
trend, from 8.4 cannibalizations per 100 flight hours in 
1996 to 9.4 in 1998. Although cannibalizations are still 
at a relatively low level, some type model series such as 
the S-3, E-2, F-14 and EA-6B are far above the 9.4 
average. Does this trend state that cannibalizations are 
increasing? Or, could the increase show that 
documentation on reporting cannibalizations has improved 
and there is no real increase? To obtain a more accurate 
assessment of this change in trend, we must take a more 
in-depth look at the cannibalization data and compare it 
to other data, i.e. degrader listings, supply shortages, 
etc. 
B. EA-6B CANNIBALIZATIONS PER 100 FLIGHT HOURS 
Table 3.2 is a NAMSO report extracted from NALDA on EA-
6B data from 1990 - 1998. Not only do we have the total 
force averages, we have cannibalization data broken down 
into deployed, readiness, and CONUS figures. The data 
reveals that the average number of cannibalizations per 100 
flight hours for the EA-6B has remained relatively stable 
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Table 3.2 EA-6B Cannibalizations Per 100 Flight 
Hours from. 1990 - 1998 
over the past six years, averaging 13.9 cannibalizations per 
100 flight hours. Compared to the other model series, EA-6B 
currently has one of the highest cannibalization rates in 
the Navy. Its rate of 14.6 cannibalizations per 100 flight 
hours, is fourth behind the S-3 at 27.9 cannibalizations, E-
2 at 17.7 cannibalizations, and F-14 at 16.6 
cannibalizations per 100 flight hours. 
Based on discussions with the Supply Support IPT 
Leader, cannibalizations have been increasing because some 
of the assets are over 20 years old. As systems approach the 
end of their effective lives, failure rates increase, and 
parts become less available. Later in this chapter, I will 
compare a list of cannibalized parts provided by 
COMVAQWINGPAC and NADEP Jacksonville to a list of degraders 
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and parts shortages provided by COMNAVAIRPAC. This 
comparison will determine how closely correlated 
cannibalized items are to parts shortages. Figure 1 is data 
extracted from NALDA by COMNAVAIRPAC's Analysis Division on 
EA-6B cannibalizations per 100 flight hours per quarter. 
These statistics are from fourth quarter fiscal year 1995 to 
third quarter fiscal year 1998. Since second quarter fiscal 
year 1997, LANT fleet cannibalization averages have been 
consistently higher than PAC fleet averages. This 
difference could be explained by the fact that COMNAVAIRPAC 
and COMVAQWINGPAC manage over 80 percent of EA-6B assets, 
and 20 percent of EA-6B aircraft are managed by 
COMNAVAIRLANT. Therefore, the program has greater 
importance to COMNAVAIRPAC,and would mostly receive better 
oversight in the areas of material support and maintenance. 
Figure 3.1 provides a better picture of the data 
presented in Table 3.2. The chart displays cannibalizations 
per 100 flight hours, per aircraft for deployed, CONUS, and 
total EA-6B assets from third quarter fiscal year 1996 to 
3rd quarter fiscal year 1998. The data shows that for total 
aircraft, the average number of cannibalizations has 
remained relatively constant with an average of 14 
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cannibalizations per 100 flight hours over this two-year 
period. However, there was a sharp decrease from 17.1 to 
11.6 cannibalizations per 100 flight hours from first to 
second quarter fiscal year 1997. After the sharp drop the 
total aircraft rate has steadily increased. Cannibalization 
rates for deployed aircraft have been quite erratic from 
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Supply Support IPT leader's Program Review 
Figure 3.2 Non Mission Capable Supply (NMCS) Data 
However, cannibalization rates for CONUS aircraft closely' 
parallel the total program trend with an increasing pattern 
over the past five quarters. Figure 3.2 is a chart brief 
that displays the percentage of EA-6B aircraft that are in a 
Non Mission Capable Supply (NMCS) status. NMCS is when an 
aircraft is not full mission capable (FMC) or mission 
capable (MC) due to lack of availability of supply parts or 
component. Figure 2.2 shows the percentage of deployed, 
CONUS, and total EA-6B assets that are NMCS per quarter from 
3rd quarter fiscal year 1996 to 3rd quarter fiscal year 
1998. Changes from quarter to qua~ter in figure 3.2 follow 
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a trend similar to the changes between quarters in figure 
3.1. This shows some correlation between the percentage of 
NMCS and the total number of cannibalizations per flight 
hour. In-depth interviews conducted with COMNAVAIRPAC's EA-
6B class desk and maintenance officers from other type 
classes revealed that aircraft in NMCS status for prolonged 
periods of time are prime targets for cannibalizations. 
Therefore it is a natural phenomenon that the more assets in 
NMCS status the higher number of cannibalizations that occur 
to keep remaining aircraft mission capable. Less FMC and MC 
aircraft available, the more flying those aircraft must 
accomplish to complete required missions. This in turn 
increases the number of both corrective·and preventive 
maintenance actions on the operating aircraft, and increases 
cost and demand on parts, which further hinders the supply 
chain. 
Aircraft can also be non-mission capable for maintenance 
(NMCM). The difference between NMCM and NMCS is that all 
the needed parts are available to complete repair for NMCM. 
The cause for not being mission capable is usually due to 
inadequate facilities, lack of support equipment, or lack of 
a :p,articular skilled maintenance person assigned to that 
unit to complete the maintenance. 
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The only way we can correlate supply shortages to higher 
cannibalization rates is to compare cannibalization parts 
data to parts shortage data. The parts shortage data is 
usually in the form of a parts degrader list. COMNAVAIRPAC 
maintains a parts degrader lists for the fleet, and NADEP 
Jacksonville maintains the list for aircraft going through 
depot level maintenance. The squadron submits reports to 
COMVAQWINGPAC monthly. COMNAVWINGPAC forwards a consolidated 
report to COMNAVAIRPAC who maintains the information in a 
database. 
C. COMPARING CANNIBALIZED PARTS LISTS TO DEGRADER LISTS 
Parts degraders are defined as unavailable parts or 
components that render an aircraft non-mission capable. The 
scarcity of these parts, make it impossible for maintenance 
personnel to repair functions vital to the performance or 
safety of the aircraft. It is necessary to identify, 
document and track these degraders so that the operations 
personnel, the Program Manager and the supply system work 
together to procure the needed parts to improve the 
readiness of the program. 
Appendix B is COMVAQWINGPAC's FY-98 list of parts that 
have been cannibalized from various EA-6B squadrons, 
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Aviation Intermediate Maintenance Depots (AIMD), 
COMVAQWINGPAC, and SDLM, and placed on aircraft from 
operational and deployed squadrons. All of these 
cannibalizations are between different activities and have 
been approved by COMVAQWINGPAC. These cannibalizations do 
not account for cannibalizations that occur within an 
activity (i.e. taking one part from an airplane in squadron 
VAQ-139 and putting the part in another aircraft from the 
same squadron). 
Appendix B is arranged in National Item Identification 
Number (NIIN) sequence. NIIN or National Stock Number (NSN) 
sequence is how more than 90 percent of repair parts or 
other stock numbered items Navy wide are tracked through the 
Navy supply system. Appendix C is COMNAVAIRPAC's Fiscal 
Year 1998 Parts Degrader List provided by the EA-6B class 
desk. 
In comparing both lists, I found that approximately 53 
percent of the parts degraders were listed on 
COMVAQWINGPAC's cannibalized parts list (57 of 108 parts 
degraders are on the fleet cannibalization list). The parts 
that are listed in both Appendix B and Appendix Care 
printed in red. This shows that there is some correlation 
between parts shortages and cannibalizations. Forty two 
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percent of the 551 parts listed in Appendix B were a result 
of parts or component supply shortages. 
If you look at the repairables in Appendix C, you will 
see that repair parts contributed to most of the shortages. 
76 percent of the repair part shortages contributed to fleet 
cannibalizations. The data also show that there are a 
higher number of each repairable part being cannibaiized, 
making repairable responsible for more than 85 percent of 
the cannibalizations caused by parts shortages. 
This further supports the claim that parts shortages 
are a main contributor to the cannibalization problem of the 
EA-6B. However, since 48 percent of the cannibalizations 
were not the direct cause of parts shortages, this data also 
supports COMNAVAIRPAC's Plans and Policy Officer's theory 
that 50 percent of the cannibalizations are for convenience. 
D. ANALYSIS OF NADEP CANNIBALIZED PARTS LIST 
The Supply Support IPT Leader stated that 99.9 percent 
of all NADEP cannibalization actions are a direct result of 
supply parts shortages. She further stated that the 
inadequate sparing level for EA-6B parts has forced the 
NADEP to repair and re-manufacturer many of the non Ready-
for-Issue components in house. The depot's component repair 
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effort has fallen short of fleet demand and the man-hours 
expended to get an aircraft through SDLM has dramatically 
increased. 
Appendix D is the NADEP Jacksonville EA-6B Cannibalized 
Parts List for fiscal years 1997 and 1998. I conducted an 
analysis of these parts by comparing the date the parts were 
ordered to the date the parts were received. This list 
revealed that for parts cannibalized it took 8.5 months on 
average, from the time NADEP Jacksonville ordered the part 
until the part was received. The average of all 
requisitions was not 8.5 months just the items that were 
cannibalized. Out of 117 cannibalized parts that contained 
receiving or shipping data, only 16 parts were received in 
less than three months and 26 parts took over a year to 
reach the NADEP. 
The reason for the lengthy order cycle time is that 
many of the components had to be produced or re-engineered 
by industry. If you look at the Inboard Slat assembly listed 
on the first page of Appendix D you will see that the 
component was order on 3 May 1996 and was not received until 
~7 March 1998, almost 23 months later. The slat assembly is 
part of the "tired iron" problem that most of the EA-6B 
flight control surface are experiencing. The main landing 
gear doors at the top of page 2 in Appendix D took almost 
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two years to be received as well. Currently, Grumman is 
producing new slats the first of which were delivered in 
October 1998. 
This kind of re-engineering effort doesn't happen 
overnight. Engineers have to develop a new design that is 
compatible to the rest of the system. Testing of the 
remanufactured components must be conducted and the re-
engineered part must by approved by the Program Manager 
prior to sending the part to the depot. This entire process 
not only takes time but is also quite costly to DoD. 
I received a piece parts shortage list from the EA-6B 
Parts Manager from NAVICP. The parts manager consolidated 
this list from Grumman, DLA, and NADEP Jacksonville at the 
September 1998 Program Review conducted at the Grumman 
Aerospace plant in St. Augustine, FL. The NAVICP parts 
shortage list did not correlate very well with the parts 
that were cannibalized in Appendix D. Less than 10 percent 
of the parts on NAVICP's llst contributed to depot level 
cannibalizations. The EA-6B Parts Manager stated that most 
of these parts were managed by DLA and that there was no 
recorded demand or outstanding requisitions for most of the 
parts on the list. 
It appears that NADEP Jacksonville is not required to 
keep track of parts degraders that slow maintenance efforts 
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and increase the time it take for an aircraft to complete 
SDLM or received a modification block. What is happening 
is that the maintenance personnel at the depot query the 
system and find that there are no parts in the supply 
pipeline and that the contractor does not plan to produce 
any of the needed part in the near future. Instead of 
ordering the parts and waiting for the system to provide the 
part, the maintenqnce personnel manufacture the part in 
house. This in house manufaoture takes time, and causes an 
underreported demand for the part. Moreover the part is 
likely reproduced at a cost higher than the manufacturer's 
cost. This contributes to the shortage of parts, and as 
previously stated, adds to the cannibalization problem. 
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IV. CURRENT CULTURE TO~S CANNIBALIZATIONS 
A. ATTITUDES REGARDING CANNIBALIZATIONS 
Most of the people who build, fly, repair and support 
aircraft understand that cannibalizations have undesirable 
affects on operational readiness. First, cannibalizations 
double the work of maintenance personnel, due to switching 
parts with other aircraft. Second, removing and ~nstalling 
parts multiple times between aircraft reduces the 
reliability of parts and increases the rate of failure. 
Third, improper or lack of documentation of cannibalization 
actions under-reports the severity of the cannibalization 
problem. With the mounting evidence against 
cannibalizations, we would expect that the Navy would avoid 
them at all cost, right? Well this is not the case. 
Cannibalizations have become a way of life not only for the 
aviation community but also on surface ships, submarines and 
other systems throughout 000. 
The reason cannibalizations occur so often is that 
cannibalizations improve short-term operational readiness of 
a squadron, company, command or battle group. For example, 
a Squadron Commander has four of four aircraft non-mission 
capable due to lack of spares. If given the option, almost 
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all Squadron Commanders would take the parts from the worst 
aircraft to make the other three aircraft full mission 
capable. When the Commander releases his Aviation 
Maintenance Readiness Report (which is submitted daily for 
deployed units) he would much rather report that 75 percent 
of his assets are mission capable versus zero assets being 
mission capable. The maintenance personnel I have talked to 
all agree that this would be the choice most successful 
Operational C?mmanders would-make. Therefore, the Navy has 
a conflicting rewards system when it comes to 
cannibalizations (i.e. get assets battle ready by any means 
possible and reduce cannibalizations because they degrade 
long-term readiness). The conflicting incentives cause the 
operational Navy to actively cannibalize and under report 
the act. 
The Program Manager wants the fleet to accurately 
report cannibalizations so that they can properly identify 
short falls in the supply chain and fight for increased 
funding to get the needed parts in the system to support the 
fleet. The Type Commanders want proper funding so that 
logisticians can acquire the needed parts and components to 
support maintenance of aircraft. This enables the Type 
Commander to meet future threats. If parts are not 
available, there is great pressure from the Type Commander 
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on down to maintenance crews to work around the material 
deficiencies and get as many aircraft to mission capable 
status as possible to deploy or make commitments. However, 
the Type Commander views cannibalizations for the curse that 
they really are and wants to see lower cannibalization 
rates, but maintain high levels of readiness so that assets 
match or exceed force goals. This is why the Navy is having 
such a difficult time finding viable solutions to rectify 
this problem. Various maintenance officers, the type desk 
and the Program Manager's supply support team believe that 
the people who can make the decisions to reduce 
cannibalizations and improve system supportability will not 
approve the money needed to resolve the problem. Stovepipe 
management practices are still preeminent within the Navy 
and DoD. The fleet commands, the supply system, the 
acquisition community and Congress promote their own self-
interests. Trust has not developed between entities that 
rely on one another to function efficiently. 
The fleet is pointing the finger at the supply system 
for not having enough spares, Congress for the lack of 
program funding, and the acquisition community for not 
designing systems that meet the customer's needs. The 
supply system is pointing its finger at acquisition and the 
fleet for changing their requirements and not documenting 
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what they actually need. Acquisition blames the fleet for 
not knowing or communicating what they want and the supply 
system for not providing full parts support for programs. 
This divided view of our senior leadership in the 
management of these programs and communities set the stage 
for the lack of focus on total system supportability and the 
cannibalization problems. New strategies are needed to 
improve supportability, validate funding and improve the 
documentation of cannibalizations. Total requirements must 
be validated to 'better support aircraft, which will in-turn 
reduce the number of cannibalizations. 
The value net model which was adapted from 
Brandenburger-Nalebuff model, which was created by Adam M. 
Brandenburger a Professor at Harvard Business School and 
Barry J. Nalebuff of the Yale School of Management. This 
model takes the five elements of a strategy and creates 
balance between those elements. Radm. Do.nald R. Eaton, the 
logistics chair at the Naval Postgraduate School, adapted 
the model specifically for logistics functions. The five 
elements are Players, Added value of each player, Tactics to 
be achieved, Rules to follow, and Scope of the program. The 
Model balances the elements between the primary players of 
program support which are the function (EA-6B logistics), 




(technical development, Engineering), suppliers (Grumman, 
Comptrollers), and competitors (Other programs, 
Outsourcing). The players in the model function in a 
foundation of shared values and trust in achieving a common 
strategic goal. That goal is maximizing life-cycle 
readiness at the best possible cost. 
Figure 4.1 is the value net model for EA-6B logistics. 
The objective of the value net model is to achieve balance 
among the players and the elements, and equilibrium in the 
value net. For example: EA-6B logistics is the function, 
and is in the center 'of the model. Customers, 
complementors, suppliers, and competitors encircl~ the 
function. There is vertical' symmetry between suppliers and 
customers, and horizontal symmetry between complementors and 
competitors. A well-balanced program establishes rules for 
each player to adhere to, achieves each player's goals, and 
ensures each player adds value to the process. No player 
will dominate the value net because a program not in balance 
will be insufficient for program effectiveness. 
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Figure 4.1 Value Net Model for EA-6B Log~stics 
DoD logistics should use a mo.del such as this proposed 
model when conducting a Logistics Support Analysis for a 
program to ensure all aspects of the program are accounted 
for when planning life cycle logistics support. For current 
programs such as EA-6B, this model can assist the Navy in 
rectifying the problems that took years to develop. 
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B. WHAT EA-6B MANAGEMENT IS DOING TODAY 
Most problems have to build and threaten the ability 
of an organization to survive before major changes that can 
effectively deal with the problems occur. The EA-6B Program 
Manger, Grumman Aerospace, NAVICP, DLA and the fleet are 
finally working together to make changes to improve 
supportability and reduce the cannibalizations. 
Several new initiatives were launched in fiscal year 
1998 to improve supportability of the EA-6B program. First, 
the NADEP, Program Manager, and Grumman Aerospace are 
working as a single team to identify program problems, pool 
resources, maximize storage facilities, and forecast parts 
usage. These organizations have funded joint engineering 
analysis to forecast increased parts usage of the flight 
control surfaces due to the effects of "tired iron". 
Second, Integrated Product Teams (IPTs) have been 
formed to manage critical components and produce parts for 
items such as landing gear, J52 engines and flight control 
surfaces. The IPTs meet regularly to work on solutions to 
problems that cannot be resolved by one organization or 
functional specialty. The IPT is comprised of cross-
functional personnel such as engineers, logisticians, 
production controllers, schedulers, examination and 
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evaluation personnel, production personnel, equipment 
specialist, etc. 
Third, Survivability studies are being conducted to 
determine requirements for EA-6B and to ensure that the 
aircraft is operational through 2015. Along with the 
survivability studies, risk analysis is being conducted to 
determine the feasibility of purchasing various parts and 
technology today vice planning future purchases. 
Fourth, DLA now attends the quarterly program reviews 
and is taking a more proactive role working with NAVICP to 
ensure the piece parts inventories support components 
managed by NAVICP and match NADEP and Fleet demand. 
Fifth, the first Suppliers Conference was conducted in 
November 1998 with industry to announce future requirements 
for the EA-6B. The intent of the conference was to stir up 
interest in EA-6B, attract innovative new companies to work 
with the Navy and Grumman Aerospace in the development of 
replacement components, and let the business community know 
that the EA-6B program is not dead. 
Sixth, the Rewing IPT has established a plan with 
Grumman to replace the center section of the wings on 81 EA-
6B aircraft. The rewing effort started in early 1998 
addresses more tired iron problems and will be completed in 
fiscal year 2005. This effort is a step in the right 
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direction but the team has already fallen behind because as 
of 14 September 1998 none of the five aircraft scheduled for 
induction in fiscal year 1998 were delivered to the depot. 
These initiatives support the Program Manager and his 
Supply Support IPT over-arching goal to have 104 operational 
EA-6B aircraft by the end of fiscal year 2000. They plan to 
do this by working with organic activities with the unified 
goal of increasing parts availability and decreasing the 
number of aircraft that are in non mission capable status. 
In addition to the above initiatives, Grumman is 
producing new Outboard Slats and fielding them at a rate of 
two slats per month for the next 6 years. NADEP 
Jacksonville is modifying old A6E landing gear doors to 
replace worn-out doors in current use. The fleet has 
committed to providing long range requirements to the NADEP 
to assist them providing support to return full mission 
capable aircraft to the fleet. 
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v. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. OBJECTIVES 
The objectives of this thesis were to research and 
present the root causes of the EA-6B cannibalizations and to 
discover ways to improve supportability and reduce EA-6B 
cannibalizatiotis. This thesis presented and discussed key 
events that lead to the current EA-6B cannibalization 
problem. An analysis was conducted on cannibalization rates 
per 100 flight hours, cannibalization data and parts 
shortage data. This thesis presented viewpoints on the 
subject of cannibalization from various personnel on 
different levels of oversight and operations with the Navy 
and the Acquisition community. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
The following are the .conclusions of this research: 
1. Shortages in the supply system and slow support 
response are the major cause of cannibalizations. 
2. Poor execution of shifting EA-6B maintenance 
responsibility from NADEPs Norfolk and Alameda to NADEP 
Jacksonville caused the EA-6B maintenance back-load, damaged 
critical flight control surface components due to inadequate 
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storage, and lengthened the pipeline for an aircraft to 
complete SDLM. 
3. The ASPA program delay scheduled maintenance which 
caused the total failure of some components, and distorted 
actual parts and component demand, which reduced the 
effectiveness of the supply system. 
4. Cannibalization rates have increased over the past 
two years and will. continue to increase unless more parts 
are expediently brought into the system. 
S. Lack of support forces the Navy to resort to 
cannibalizations at the operational and training level to 
make commitments. 
6. Documenting and trac~ing of cannibalizations have 
improved at the Wing, COMNAVAIRPAC and NAVAIR. However, 
documentation of cannibalizations within squadrons and 
onboard must improve. 
7. The Program Manager, Grumman, and the supply system 
are executing a.plan to have 104 aircraft mission capable by 
the end of fiscal year 2000. 
B. NAVICP and DLA have not fully coordinated efforts 
to ensure proper material support for the EA-6B program. 
9. The Navy has not determined what is most important: 
maintaining the integrity of the weapon system or making all 
operational and training missions. 
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10. The supply system is not fully aware of the parts 
degraders, rendering it difficult to provide material 
support. 
11. The time period for an aircraft to go through SDLM 
is too long and the cost is too high. 
12. There is a lack of total asset visibility at 
various levels causing unnecessary delay in the supply chain 
further del~y repair and maintenance of aircraft. 
c. RECOMMENDA~IONS TO IMPROVE SUPPORTABILITY 
Recommendation 1: The Navy must develop a strategic plan to 
ensure that supportability and sparing levels are in the 
system to support the operation of 104 EA-6B which is the 
current PAA. 
Recommendation 2: The Navy should make a binding contract 
for a Navy-wide readiness target with all Dhe players in the 
value net for EA-6B logistics. This should include 
rewarding contractors with incentive based contracts to 
obtain an 104 PAA for EA-6B. 
Recommendation 3: Disestablish the ASPA program. The ASPA 
program delays critical maintenance, and distorts the demand 
for parts by causing lumpy demand of material. 
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Recommendation 4: Employ Total Asset Visibility for all 
critical parts and assign an individual or IPT responsible 
for expediting parts to the end users (i.e. depot, squadron, 
Wing). Current system and available technology can support 
this. This will allow maintenance or operational commands 
to locate needed parts in the logistics chain prior to 
requisitioning pa~ts, and obtain immediate status of 
outstanding r~quisitions. 
Recommendation 5: Get NAVICP and DLA involved early in the 
establishment of sparing levels and maintenance rates for 
upcoming programs such as F22 and Joint Strike Fighter. 
Recommendation 6: Obtain full funding for the maintenance of 
the additional 24 aircraft added to PAA for EA-6B. This 
will enable the Program Manager to achieve the goal of 104 
full mission capable aircraft before the end of fiscal year 
2000. 
Recommendation 6: Develop Contingency Plan to Change 
maintenance facilities and conduct training in case of 
another facility Closures. 
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Recommendation 8: Task Industry and the program office to 
plan for upgrades utilizing future technologies, and to 
conduct smart shutdown of production lines. 
Recommendation 9: Upgrade software for the NALCOMIS 
maintenance program to make it easier to report 
cannibalizations and reduce the need for two separate 
reports when maintenance actions includes cannibalized 
parts. 
Recommendation 10: The Wing should forward degraders lists 
to the Program Manger and NAVICP Components Manager, not 
just the Type Commander. This will ensure that the supply 
chain is aware of the parts shortages as soon as they occur 
and that can take quicker action to get more parts into the 
pipeline. 
Recommendation 11: Determine the critical path for an 
aircraft to complete SDLM. Employ Critical Path Management 
techniques to reduce to time it takes for an aircraft to 
complete SDLM. 
Recommendation 12: The Navy must incentivize contrators and 
program managers to focus on total life cycle support of 
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current programs even if short-term mission accomplishment 
is sacrificed to achieve it. The use of award and incentive 
based contracts should increase to achieve this. 
D. AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
The results reported in this thesis by no means 
provides a complete answer to the EA-6B parts support and 
cannibalization problems.. This thesis identifies prime 
culprits and recommends ways to that can rectify the 
situation. Some areas of follow-on research are discussed 
below. 
(1) There is a need to conduct actual research on 
squadron maintenance procedures, and to collect data on 
failure rates and the effects that cannibalizations have on 
maintenance crews in regard to man-hours spent and 
documentation of cannibalization. 
(2) A study on the benefits of the ASPA program should 
be conducted to examine the percentage of aircraft that are 
deferred for depot level maintenance. This study would also 
determine the impact ASPA has had on the life of components 
and failure rates of parts and components, and to weigh the 
pros and cons of delaying maintenance. 
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(3) A research study similar to this thesis should be 
conducted on the S-3 Skywarrior due to the fact that the S-3 
has the highest cannibalization rate in naval aviation. 
(4) Conduct in-depth research on applying the 
Brandenburger-Nalebuff model with MILSPEC 1388 in preparing 
an LSA for an acquisition program to determine if the model 
will improve life-cycle logistics support. 
6S 
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APPENDIX A. SUMMARY OF EVALUATION OF EA-6B 
COMPONENTS 
Prior to evaluation, each component was uncrated (when crated). The aircraft 
examiner and other members of the team would then perform a comprehensive visual 
examination of the component. All components consisting of aluminum honeycomb 
or composite structure were thoroughly tap-tested for delaminations and disbonds. 
Defects including corrosion, cracks, dents, punctures, broken fittings, missing parts, 
warpage, and non-standard fleet repairs were also considered in determining the 
material condition category assigned to a given component. The level of repair and 
man-hours required to implement the repair were always discussed between shop 
artisans, aircraft examiner and engineering prior to assigning the material condition 
number. Information appearing on the component identification plates was also 
examined to verify part number and document serial number when available. The 
number corresponding to the material condition was also documented then painted 
directly on the component and on all sides of the package/container once repackaged. 
The packaging condition generally fell into a category of Excellent, Good, 
Fair, Poor, Very Poor, or none (no package). In most cases where the packaging 
condition was categorized as poor or very poor, the package was either rotted, water 
logged, warped, open, and/or damaged in transit. This information was also 
documented to demonstrate the impact poor packaging had on the material condition 
of a component. . 
A database was compiled and maintained throughout the evaluation process. 
Progress and results were periodically reported to NA VICP to keep them abreast of 
their dwindling supply of repairable assets. 
FINDINGS: 
Enclosure (1) provides a summary of the 708 components evaluated. This 
summary is broken down into three sections.· Section I provides the total number of 
components evaluated by stock number and the total number of each that fell into one 
of the four material-condition categories described above. Section II also provides 
the total number of components evaluated by stock number and the total number of 
each that fell into one of the six package-condition categories described above. 
Section III provides a detailed listing of part number, serial number, material 
condition, and package condition for each component evaluated. 
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Category 1 - Repair requirements for component would be minimal and require a 
number of man-hours below the standard allocated to the depot for repair. 
Category 2 - Repair requirements would be standard and could be accomplished 
within the number of man-hours allocated to the depot for repair. 
Category 3 - Repair requirements would be extensive and well above the number of 
man-hours allocated to the depot for repair. 
Category 4 - Component was damaged beyond the depot's current repair capabilities 
or was obsolete. Generally, the component would require a "re-manufacturing 
process" vice repair process that would exceed the total cost of replacement. 
Throughout the evaluation process, many common defects and failure modes 
were identified for each type ofEA-6B component. The following provides a brief 
summary: 
1. Nose Radomes: 
Total Evaluated: 52 
Material Condition: Category 1 - 11.5% 
Category 2 - 23.1 % 
Category 3 - 23.1 % 
Category 4 - 38.5% * 
Typical damage: Delaminations, disbonds and breaks in fiberglass 
shell, corrosion in vicinity of fasteners. 
Note: All identified as category 4 are to be re-shelled under OEM 
contract. 
2. Rudders: 
Total Evaluated: 1 
Material Condition: Category 3 
Typical damage: Severe corrosion/moisture and disbonds in the 
aluminum honeycomb trailing edge assembly with many non-standard 
repairs. Corrosion in vicinity of fasteners attaching leading edge 
access panel to rudder. Corrosion along primary beam of trailing edge 
assembly. Rudders reworked concurrently with SDLM aircraft have, 
or require numerous taco-type repairs on trailing edge. 
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Note: This was the only F-condition rudder in supply during 
evaluation period. 
3. Outboard Slats (EA-6B): 
Total Evaluated: 32 
Material Condition: Category 1 - 6.3 % 
Category 2 -15.6 % 
Category 3 - 21.9 % 
Category 4 - 56.3 % 
Typical damage: Severe corrosion/moisture resulting in disbonds in 
the slat aluminum-hon,eycomb, trailing-edge assembly with many non-
standard repairs. Warpage of trailing edge assembly, worn actuator 
attach fittings, cracks in leading edge skin, worn/chaffed upper 
locklips, and cracked track-attach ribs at SS-249 and SS-187. 
4. Inboard Slats (A6-E): 
Total Evaluated: 10 
Material Condition: Category 1 - 20 % 
Category 2 - 70 % 
Category 3 - 10 % 
Category 4 - 0 % 
Typical damage: Severe corrosion/moisture and disbonds in trailing 
edge assembly on those reworked concurrently with SDLM aircraft. 
Note: There were no F-condition EA-6B inboard slats in supply during 
evaluation period. Those evaluated were configured for the A6-E 
aircraft, not EA-6B. Seven of the 10 evaluated were recently 
manufactured under contract for the A-6E composite wing. A6-E 
inboard slats require considerable modification prior to use on EA-6B 
aircraft. 
5. Inboard Flaps (EA-6B, older configuration): 
Total Evaluated: 110 
Material Condition: Category 1 - 1 % 
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Category 2 -14.5 % 
Category 3 - 46.4% 
Category 4 - 38.1 % 
Typical damage: Severe corrosion/moisture resulting in disbonds in 
the aluminum honeycomb trailing edge assembly. Many non-standard 
repairs in trailing edge assembly. Nearly all hinge fittings had 
corrosion in the center lug bushings and up-lock rollers. Most of the 
up-lock rollers were seized up as a result of corrosion. 
Note: A large number of these components were identified as higher-
configuration flaps although they were of the older configuration. 
6. Inboard Flaps (EA-6B, newer configuration): 
Total Evaluated: 68 
Material Condition: Category 1 - 11.8 % 
Category 2 - 42.2 % 
Category 3 - 35.3 % 
Category 4 - 11.7 % 
Typical daIDage: Corrosion/moisture and disbonds in the aluminum 
honeycomb trailing edge assembly. Nearly all hinge fittings had 
corrosion in the center lug bushings and up-lock rollers. Most of the 
up-lock rollers were seized up as a result of corrosion. 
7. Inboard Flaps (A6-E): 
Total Evaluated: 5 
Material Condition: Category 1 - 40 % 
Category 2 - 60 % 
Category 3 - 0 % 
Category 4 - 0 % 
Typical damage: Severe corrosion/moisture resulting in disbonds in 
the aluminum honeycomb trailing edge assembly. Many existing 
repairs in trailing edge assembly. Nearly all hinge fittings had 
corrosion in the center lug bushings and up-lock rollers. Most of the 
up-lock rollers were seized up as a result of corrosion. 
8. Outboard Flaps (EA-6B, older configuration): 
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Total Evaluated: 97 
Material Condition: Category 1 - 9.3 % 
Category 2 -18.5 % 
Category 3 - 21.6 % 
Category 4 - 50.5 % 
Typical damage: Severe corrosion/moisture reSUlting in disbonds in 
the aluminum honeycomb trailing edge assembly. Many existing 
repairs in trailing edge assembly. Cracks in lower skin of trailing edge 
assembly at hinges. Nearly all hinge fittings had corrosion in the 
center lug bushings and up-lock rollers. Most of the up-lock rollers 
were seized, up as a result of corrosion. A tear-down study conducted 
by the A-6 FST/Code 4.3.3 revealed excessive quantity of adhesive 
used in three large area repairs resulted in a significant increase in 
weight in addition to all of the discrepancies annotated above. 
Note: A large number of these components were identified as a 
higher-configuration flap, although they were of the older 
configuration. 
9. Outboard Flaps (EA-6B, newer configuration): 
Total Evaluated: 43 
Material Condition: Category 1 - 34.9 % 
Category 2 - 32.6 % 
Category 3 - 25.5 % 
Category 4 - 7 % 
Typical damage: Corrosion/moisture and disbonds in the aluminum 
honeycomb trailing edge assembly. Cracks in lower skin of trailing 
edge assembly at hinges. Nearly all hinge fittings had corrosion in the 
center lug bushings and up-lock rollers. Most of the up-lock rollers 
were seized up as a result of corrosion. 
10. Outboard Flaps (A-6E): 
Total Evaluated: 13 
Material Condition: Category 1 - 61.5 % 
Category 2 - 23.1 % 
Category 3 -7.7 % 
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Category 4 -7.7 % 
Typical damage: Nearly all hinge fittings had corrosion in the center 
lug bushings and up-lock rollers. Most of the up-lock rollers were 
seized up as a result of corrosion. These require modification for use 
on EA-6B aircraft. 
11. Inboard Flaperons: 
Total Evaluated: 79 
Material Condition: Category 1 - 15.2 % 
Category 2 - 25.3 % 
Category 3 - 20.3 % 
Category 4 ~ 39.2 % 
Typical damage: Severe corrosion/moisture and disbonds in the 
aluminum honeycomb trailing edge assembly. Damaged hinges. 
Fiberglass trailing edge damage. 
12. Outboard Flaperons: 
Total Evaluated: 30 
Material Condition: Category 1 - 36.7 % 
Category 2 - 23.3 % 
Category 3 - 26.6 % 
Category 4 - 13.4 % 
Typical damage: Cut, bent, and corroded hinge. Fiberglass trailing 
edge damage. 
Note: No aluminum honeycomb in structure. 
13. Horizontal Stabilizers: 
Total Evaluated: 105 
Material Condition: Category 1 - 6.6 % 
Category 2 - 45.7 % 
Category 3 - 23.8 % 
Category 4 - 25.7 % ** 
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Typical damage: Severe corrosion/moisture and disbonds in the 
aluminum-honeycomb trailing edge assembly. Numerous existing 
honeycomb repairs on trailing edge assembly. Damage to trailing 
edge assembly resulting from improper transportation methods of 
those received by the storage facility with inadequate or no packaging. 
This problem has also occurs when those with inadequate or no 
packaging are transported from the storage facility to the receiving 
rework activity. Evidence of cracked ribs in the box-beam section, 
particularly at the outboard closure rib, was also observed. 
Note: All identified as category 4 were found to be obsolete 
configurations, the majority of which were misidentified as a non-
obsolete configuration. The majority of those identified as category 
3' s had ext~nsive trailing edge damage and would be good candidates 
for trailing edge replacements. 
14. Upper and Lower Speedbrakes: 
Total Evaluated: 62 
Material Condition: Category 1 - 21 % 
Category 2 - 45.2 % 
Category 3 - 14.5 % 
Category 4 - 19.4 % 
Typical damage: Corrosion and disbonds in the aluminum-honeycomb 
trailing edge assembly (not as severe as with other components). 
Damaged, corroded attach fitting holes. 
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00-451-8172 iBULLET ASSY 




00-465-2357 iFITTING ASSY 
i 
100-465-2370 !STRUTASSY 
: 00-479-9982 ICLAMP SECTOR 
:00-479-9990 IBULLET ASSY 
I 
100-480-3247 ICONTROL RAD 
'00-482-4221 ISHOULDER PIN 
i06-Mar-98 iAIMD 



















134 17328-GS98 , 
1139 
1 1 7356-GV06 
1139 i 8063-GV03 
1132 18140-GP65 h 34 ! 8041-GS32 
139 i 8077 -GV86 '00-482-6607 ISHAFT ASSY 
100-482-6608 .· .. I~ .. ~~~! .. ~~~y· .... 
'00483-1844 IBIRDCAGE ACT 
...... ········ .... ··19=Kifar=98···· .. ·IAiiVio· 
·········· ....... ·f·· ...... · .. ····· ___ ... ····H ..... H ...... _ ..... 1 ......................... . 
139 18077-=GVS:=7· ...... · ...... ·-.... · .., 
i16-0ct-97 133 '32"-"'-"""""'!7281-~GP"79''''''-
100483=1844 ······· .... \S'iROCAGE··ACf ................................................. !._ ......... __ ............... _-_ ... _._ .. -i7281-GP79 
'064S"3=185' .. 3:::··· .............. ·· ...... ' .. L' .... E::::::"·j'E·RA·: ....S·:;::-·s~:·'Y .. ·:............ · ................ · ............ · ..· ...... ' .... · ..· .... · ............ · ................ , · ........ j .... :· .. ::: .. ::: .... • ........ · ...... · .... -!733S:GP ... O=9--· ........ · .. · .... ·, 
:00-494-5734 ,BOLT, SHEAR \ 7259-GT75 
128 . i7300-GF38 
136 18064-G647 
'00-575-3469 IRPM INDICATOR 1142 !8076-GC42 
:00-630-0310 I LOX COUPLING 132 i7268-GX50 
125-Jun-98 ICVWP 137 !8173-G907 
! 
1129 120-Feb-98 ICVWP I :8050-GK27 
00-689-3450 IPANEL AND S 
00-758-8090 !DOOR ASSY 
00-758-8090 IBATTERY DOOR , : 14-May-98 1129 i8076-GC46 ! ! 
'00-759-8492 !ASN-50 :08-Jun-98 i8156-GL21 
:00-781-3990 ilRECTIFIER TRANSFORMER 18066-GP50 
f60-787-1010 PROBE !8051-GN35 
'00-803-2767 IIPI !7301-GP71 
00-8"0"3=2767 ···················fp·f··· .. ········ .. ···· .. ···········.. , .. ::: .. -........................ ;, .. 8:::"134-GP40 
00-822-3032 jHEAT EXCHANGE i~\ANP .. 11?c·· ........ · .. · .. T8041-(rK08 
,00=82'2=30 ···························..· .. ·yEXCHANGE .................................................... , '2 ~=~: .. ~=~~~ ... _ ····················!a042=GK1S·. 
········ .. · ..·· .. ·-...... ·· ..... · ..1·72T9-GU4S--·-· .. ·j 
(00-869-9480 IINDICATOR 
:00-871-0592 -!'=F"""'UE=L-::F=L-=O""""W-:-::T=RA~N=S=FE=R::--' 
'00-871-0592 IF/F TX 
00-872-2624 ISHUTOFF VALVE 
00-877-8824 !SENORSPEC 
00-894-1420 IVALVE , 
77 
18-Mar-98 








'06:906-:"()59If-""~COMPENSATOR ,.,-" ... 25-Nov-97 i142 j133 i7323-GX02 
OO:90-6-059S"'-"TcOMPENSATOR -, .. --.-- .. -.--.. ". 07-Nov-97 ;128 1129 :7310-GK29 
'ob~iH3:::;'72~r'--VALVE----'-"---"-" 29-Jul-98 ICVWP 1129 i8206-GK02 
00~9 18=0862 . ':IGNITERCAsCE15=Oa=§7 .jAfM5T13~,'T?~~~:GS69" . 
'6b~92b~S878 .... , lSENsoR,TEMP ., 2s=Juf=98 iSDLM i129 18152-<3T47 
b6=925~676;REGU[ATORAssY 18-Sep-98 IAfMDlf29' ····'18259-GK34 ..... , ......... ,,! 
00-932-4257 . HHHiSwfTCH 14=Sep~98 [131' .H'· .. · 1128 18255=GF77" HH' 
'00-939-0507 !VALVE LINEAR 19-Feb-98 ICVWP 1139 j8043-GV28 
'00-939-0507 :LlNEAR VALVE 25-Feb-98 :131 .J132 i8055-GP36 
00-939-0507 !SOLENOID VALVE 19-Mar-98 iCVWP :131 !8055-GP36 
00-939-0507 VALVE 29-Jul-98 !CVWP 1129 i8209-GK44 
00-946-5379 lOlL COOLER ASSY 30-Mar-98 ICVWP 1141 !8088-GW94 
00-950-3404 !FUEL SOLENOID 09-Jan-98 iCVWP 1142 i7282-GC29 
00-950-9495 !BUSHING 04-Sep-98 ICVWP 1129 !8246-GK26 
00-97-3760 IVALVE 07-May-98 !128 1131 i8126-GN05 
r06~970-3760 iTEMP CONTROL VALVE 10-0ct-97 1139 !135 1 7282-GX84 
100=970-3760 ITEMP CONTROL VALVE 09-0ct-97 j135 1133 l7282-GX84 
[00:970-3761 ITEMP CONTROLLER 18-May-98 ICVWP 1131 !8138-GN59 
,'00-970-3768 iTEMP CONTROLLER08-Jun-98 ICVWP 1139 i8157-GV91 I 
rOO-970=3768IcONTROLLER 08-May-98 ·····!C\iViiPTf33"'·liH27=GX64] 
r~~~:~·~~::;; .. '.· .••. ' .. '.' .. '.J~~~~!.~gMP 03~Feb=98'1~~'I~·~~· ... ,'.'··. '·'·"'18o.~~~~I.5~'::.,.,,'i 
06=976=6672 ..... ··j~~~~~~ASSY' ~~~~:~~:: H j~~l~~:"'~"!;~~~~~~'~""! 
'00-970-6672 !DAMPNER WHEEL 11-Dec-97 iCVWP 1136 j7329-G634 
00-971-2668 ISHAFT ASSY 28-Jul-98 ISDLM 1129 i8163-GW60 
00-971-2668 !SHAFT ASSEMBLY .04-Mar-98 1141 1133 !7309-GW12 
100-971-2668 ISHAFT ASSY 18-Mar-98 ICVWP 1141 !7309-GW12 » 
'00-971-2668 iSHAFT ASSY 28-Jul-98 ISDLM 1129 i8152-GK30 
100-971-3731 IENG MOUNT FITIING ,30-Mar-98 ICVWP 1129 i8088-GK39 
100-983-4383 iTRANSMITIER 20-Feb-98 !CVWP 1141 !8048-GW43 
00-983-4383 iTRANSMITIER 23-Jun-98 ,iCvwp 1129 i8168-GF50 
! 06.:-983-43S3.----rTRANSMrrT~--··-·--'·---20-Feb-98 .. i CVWP 1130 i 8051-GM28 
'OO~983-4383' JTRANSMITIER ., ___ . ____ .11-Sep-98 1140 1137 j8254-G916 I 
iOO-983-4383 ITRANSMITIER 29-Apr-98 ICVWP 1133 18118-GX52 I 
IACCELEROMETER '12-Mar-98 ISLDM 1141 !7337-GW37 ! 
nn~lqR4~1n~jR"""" t~gg~-~~:g~'~+~=' , .... " ..  .. "." .., .. ·····~~~r.~ts~~~"lg~~fUr····'~'r~ib~~g~~,i 
~ . j .......... I 06~984=f628 .. , ...... ""IACCeIEROMETER .. ·66~Jan=98~I~~~'.,~J~,~~~_~. ·····T7351=GlH4- i 
i61~616=b375TREPAIR'KIT 25-Sep-98 ICVWP i1281a'266=GF75"j 
'01~011-4367 iPANEL 11-Sep-98 :140 1128 i8244-GF32 j 
'01~017-5361 iEMERG RAT-----------------T7-Nov-97 iCVWP '134 '7315-GS37 i 
I I :Of~021-8686 IRUDDER ASSY 28-Jul-98 ISDLM 1129 
01~041-3935 IRUDDER PACK 24-Sep-98 ICVWP 1137 
01-041-9633 iSCREW 20-0ct-97 1133 1132 I I 
01-043-9832 IICS CB 03-Nov-97 !128 1132 







01-060-5049 lAIR NAV COMPUTER :04-Dec-97 7337-GS55 
01-060-5049 iANC ::t:11;j_ESe::::p::l_9nc8rl-;iAi'i--'W1Q----+a82;:;-:4ii:5:;-G~F:::A4inO--j 
i-.:-=-::-:-::-:--::-::::-:;;;:-:-:::= 
"01=060-5049 lAIR NAV COMPUTER !24-Sep-9 8264-GW94 
.01=060=5649 ··········TANC·"· , 11-Se ... , .. :;:: .. :: .... " ....................... ;:.::::: 251":GI=58 
o 1-065=S429 ............ TCR5ss0VEFffUSE ........... i21=tiiiay-98"i814'6=GM'78" 
, • • •••••••••••••• M ••• ,iH •••• H._ •• _ •••• _ ••••••••• H ••••• H •• __ ••• M •••••••• 
01=06'7=8336 ···········!6ICPRESSUREfRANstiiiTrrER:26=Nov=97 ····IAftiiio ········1134 i7329-GM15 
................. '16=Feb=9S;128 "'[139 ; 8037":G\l95 
'01-095-9182 iSTAB ACTUATOR :06-Jan-98 1131 1133 \7353-GX16 
:01-098-2239 lvALVE 26-Jun-98 CVWP /133 i8177-AX67 
:01-098-2239 IVALVE 26-Jun-98 1133 18177-AX69 
'01-124-7954 !RADAR 07-May-98 '133 !8126-GX62 
[01-139-7385 IPHD25-Sep-98 138 18265-GL9~ 
01-145-2528 IWHITEHOUSE DUCT ASSY '20-Mar-98 1129 i8074-GK11 
'01-145-2528 IDUCT ASSY 132 j8055-GP39 , 
:01-147-3098 ······TsoRf··· ······················" .. 30·" ..... -... -1813s=GM63 .. "·": 
. ~ 
:01'=158=2647 .... ~ .. "I!~·~~!!~:~ .. C?~_~~.~~~!:·· ... ·" .... TS015:.-GC7r .. " 
101=176='7976 ILAUNCH BAR ................................. , .... , ... c;: ••••••. :..... 14 f-"··"·"··-··t8f90~GW1Ef-····"···) 
'01='1"'76=7976 'OP:'NOSE 'TOW141-'--"-'-'1aTso-GVV16'"'-'"-" 
; 
:01-196-9924 ;-;-IU;-----------'-; 7.:19~_M;-;-a-r--:-9~8----r.=:-;;:::-~;-:-----i1~80;:;:7::;:6--:-G~C~44;-;----i 
:01-196-9924 ,25-Sep-98 38 i8265-GL96 
.01-196-9924 '18-Mar-98 !8076-GC44 
'01-196-9924 22-Sep-98 !8265-GS89 
: 01-196-9924i 24-Mar-98 :8082-GX88 
:01-196-9924 :21-Sep-98 141 i8263-GW75 









I01-22S=S873· ... 1RELAV·······" 
'01-242-3803 IASN-123 
'01-242-3803 IASN-123 
01-242-6450 iNAV COMPUTER 
:01-242-6450 P 
,01-242-6450 123 COMPUTER 
01-242-6450 123 COMPUTER 
.......................... " . "'l'24=tiiiar~98 ·····_·"·"· .. ······--l'ao8f:.GC03"--'--: 





















01-259-6607 SD 7 VAR ATTENUATOR 22-Jan-98 1141 ! 1132 7330-GC06 
79 
'(fi"~286-1609- "'''--''; COl """------iO-Mar -98 j 141 i 133 
't"1"~2'i3'6~'1"6"(j"9 .. j·ct5f····· . . ·2·5~·6·ct=§~i····· ! 142 ...... ..····f1""3·9 .... . .. ""T729":t=G\l33 ! 
61~28b:1609 .. lcor 25~Mar-98 T13b 11'33 'iS083~Gxb5 .......J 
.... j .•...••..•••. _ •• __ ••• _ •••.•• 'o1:284~51651 sTAsiLizER"04=Nov=97 1128Tf33'i728S:GP92'" 
'01=284:5165' . TSTSOSTAs . 16=Oa=9i 1133 '[132"!728S:Crp92 .. , ............... : 
01-287-2762 !RELAY BOX -29-Apr-98 1137 1131 !8118-GN78 
i8078-GX78 
:Of~287-2762 -- jRELAY ASSY ---------,,"- 14-May-98 1135 j137 !8133-G958 
:01-291-0250 !BRACKET 14-May-98 iCVWP 1129 !8084-GM99 
"01-293-7659 iCRANK ASSY ----------,--, 28-Jul-98 ICVWP 1129 :8150-GK06 
! 
:01-337-4691 iAYK-14 ____ =.~-.. --1"3-Mar-98 1131 1128 i8036-GV80 
!(j'1".:j3i469r-IAYK-14 10-Mar-98 1131 11 32 18069-GP55 i 
101-337-4691 "IAYK-14 20-Feb-98 1128 1139 i8036-GV80 I 
:01-337-4691 JAYK-14 19-Mar-98 1139 1132 !8074-GP84 ""I 
i~~~;!~~~~~ "'''i~X~=~~ONfROCPANEC ........................ ··:~~~~t~~::~"lb~"'·~!;----:!~!!~gr~- ""1 
•........•.•. """." ... ,,.... _ ... " .••. 1. ...•.•. _ ... __ ."" .• "'_ .," ;tH~341~1625 . I Rcp 25-Sep-98 ! CVWP 1141 lS266=-GW19 , 
'tH=34f=1625' ···!HARMCONTROl..PANEL 28=Sep=98 . ICVWP !141is269:GW68 ...! 
-01=342:5876'---- iRELAY ASSY ~,=~=~~=_~. 14-Sep-98 i140 1129 !8240-GN55 
{)1-342-5876 IRELAY ASSY 24-Aug-98 jSDLM !141 i8230-GW48 
IARC-182 RELAY BOX----,,03-Nov-97 ;141 1135 !7307-GT65 
IARC-182 11-Sep-98 \140 1130 i8239-GM12 ~01-342-5876 
01-342-8983 iANN PANEL 29-Apr-98 ICVWP 1131 18119-GN80 
:01-345-1321 iVALVE, ROTARY 11-Feb-98 icvwp 1140 i8041-GV91 
01-356-1662 jPRESS RATIO CNTRL 31-0ct-97 ICVWP j132 i7304-GP91 
80 
01=356-1662----rPRC -'"":20-May-98 !AIMD 1138 
,o-f=356=-1662---lpRC VALVE ,03-Jun-98 ICVWP 1130 
:6-1-~356-1662' iPRC --:26-May-98 ICVWP 1135 
01=356=1662 ············TPRC······ ... . ....•...•. "·~~~=~·~.~~~~19~~ ... r~~.~- .. 
'01-356-166 ·' ... ;N:·;·:E;;;;····C·::::··O::;;;···N'··::T;;::·R~::··O:::··;L········................................................. '22-Jul-98! CVWP 
'01-356-1662 ··················-r23=Feb=9S··· 
"11=Oec=97 01-413-3351 ......... "'TciUiE: 






... _ ......... __ ... _ ...... _ ..... . 
2-GF09 
3-GK52 
01-413-3351 I DATA CONVERTER __ --'-i3".-0:--S-:-e_p-=-9-:::-8--'-:~--+-:-:::_=__--+i 8=2:-=6-:::-9--::G=W=6::-5_-.; 
'01-415-5770 !EFIS CONTROL 21-Apr-98 i8098-GT80 
.~~-::-:::-~==~~~-~~~~~~ 01-415-5770 ONTROL PANEL ,28-Jul-98 iSDLM !8198-GW65 
01-415-5770 IEFIS CONTROL BOX i25-Feb-98 ,CVWP . i8055-GP29 
:01-415-5770 iEFIS CONTROL BOX 117:-0ct-97 i7290-GV01 
'01-415-5779 EADI :28-May-98 /8138-GM62 
'01-415-5779 IEFIS INDICATOR i21-Apr-98 18098-GT83 
Of~15-5779 :EADI --"--"-01-Dec-97 \7333-GM17 
i01~15-5779 '-+=!EA::-:-=DC=-I ------ ----~2-0ct-97 !7294-GC13 
:01415-5779 'EFIS IND (EHSI) ---··-------r-29-A:-p-r-9=8:--f-:--:=-:::----h--:-:----'!-=-81:-::0,....,.4---::G~W=9=2---' 
'-01-415-5779 FIS INDICATOR ---~1-Sep-98 i8261-GL78 
;'"0'1"4'1"""5:'577'9 ...... ·······TEAtjr· ........................ · .......... M ...... .. 
101-415-5779' ._l·EAOi·· 








,01-415-5779 IEFIS IND (EADI) 
'01-415-5779 IEADI 
'01-415-5779 IEADI 
i01~15-5779 IINDICATOR DIGITAL 





. ...... -.-.. -.l7337=GX3~f--·--· 
-GS-29---"'-' 
128 18208-GF31 
11 30 !8056-GM40 
! 11-Aug-98 CVWP 128 18223-GF87 
,16-Dec-97 I 7349-GK54 , 











D 10 oscILLATOR ........... ················-·!26=Jan-98 
ADOME :20-Apr-98 128 1138 
I 
06-Mar-98 142 1129 
"1128AM40506 PUSH ROD ASSY 0-Mar-98 CVWP 1134 
,1128BM42007-1 UPLOCK FITTING 7-Jul-98 SDLM 131 
'1128BM42151-1 INLG SUPPORT i 17-Jul-98 SDLM 131 
11281m40306-1 iLATCH SUPPORT 17-Jul-98 SDLM 131 









'99=371=03S0---TDSDC-------------------------- 01-Jul-98 I'CVWP i,133 i8181-GX05 
99:37T-0380 ---, !CONVERTER--------- 30-Apr-98 !CVWP !-;-14-:-c1:----'-::i8-;-11:-4~-G=W~82=----' 
'99~3i1-0380---- :DSDC ---------------02-0ct-97 !CVWP 1134 7275-GS06 
99:371:0380:050C 08=Jun-98TCVWP i139 : 8158-GV94 
: 99~3i1=b38b rOSOC .. . 21:May:98 "Tc\iWP . :141 i 8141 ~GW02" .........., 
99-89f~999b ·lscAoc····· 14-May-98 'TCvwp 113S:8T1-9:Gf6§ 
:'99:'8'94:'8'1"8"1""'" .. ;'S'Cil~DC""M'6"[JNT' "'2'2'~Apr~'98'" . fcVWP" i"1·3·S········ ... 'i"S"f1"{:'G'T34" I 
'99-998-8719' ;COMPUTER---------·- 23-Feb-98 ICVWP 1130 !8053-GM34 
ASIGN-2122 iRECORDER REP :25-Feb-98 ;128 i135 ,8055-GT72 
".--:-;:-::-;:-_._-_._. -------- ' 
~~2.-P-408A ___ iENGINE ____________ 17-Apr-98 j128 1141 
J52-P_408A iENGINE 17-Apr-98 1137 1138 
J52-P_408A !ENGINE 20-Apr-98 1128 !138 
J52-P_408A .iENGINE 27-Apr-98 1137 1133 
:LL-298-M741 !BAND 10 CONVERTER 13-Nov-97 1131 !134 






n::=Z98-M74-b i LOCAL OSCILLATOR . 03::--:-D=-e-C-:-9=7:--:I-: C::-:-VW-;:-:-;:P=---'"h:-4=0--~=73::-::0=2-:-G=U-:-:0:-71----i 
,~~Z9~~M74~ ___ !FRONT SECTOR . _____ !9-NOv-97 !_13_1_--,-1_1_34 __ -,-7_3_15_-_G_S-:,,40_. 
Cannibalized Parts from Squadron VAQ-129 only 
52-2655 EEL :02-Dec-97 
82 
iOO-152-2661 
'60=152=2743 ············;BRAKE ............... ~ 
iDEFOG VALVE ASSY i25-Feb-98J~~? . ! 132 
········:36=Jun=98 i 129 
00-152-2743 BRAKE ! 11-Jun-98 1129 
-0-6=152=2743-'· ; BRAKE ASSY- ·-·---·-----··T22-Jun-98 i129 901 
. • ... .. .. ..J................ ·==.-00-;;:······················: 06~1S2=2743 iBRAKEI28=May=9S 1129 146-GP89 
00:152-2743-- iBRAKE -·-(13-Jul-98 1129 i130 18194-GM01 
66=152-2743-··· iB-RAKE·---------··-----···-··'j"11-JUn-98-· 1129 i128 18157-GF83 
60=157=3971 ·····lAFTfURSfNE ·······115=Oe· 129']142 ······················1-73<)"3=GC23-··. 
06-163-5829- . iEJECTION BLEED HOSE ASSY i03-Apr-98 1129 136 18091-G608 
00-163-5829 iHOSE ASSY_I,':.:.0.~47 .....-_SM .... eaPy--9988 !i
l
"'112299 11 3371 18253-G902 66=168=7826 BEACON RCVR . ............. IUUU ,-GC14 
00-169-0585 iCANOPY SEAL VALVE 103-Feb-98 j129 139 /8012-GV85 
:00-179-5086 iBARO ALT _____ ... _-.J~9-Jan-98 .1129 .140 18009-GU18 
166=205=2253--···· :AFT CANOPY ASSY !13-Jan-98 j129 1139 7314-GV79 
iOO-238-7051 :PIN ASSY PO-Aug-98 1129 :137 8218-G909 
:00-279-9391 iPACKING 128-MaY-98 129 1133 8147-GX87 
:00-303-6103 :COUPLING ASSY i26-Mar-98 1129 i128 8085-GF54 
r66=332=393·5·TRAOOtiifE···· .................................. ··\:1'8=Oe6:97-t12·9 i 1'·-2;::·~8··· ··············-··+=i339-=GF28--·· j 
.00-332-3935 RADOME i03-0ct-97 1129 i142 253-GC77 
'00-332-3935 iNOSE RADOME i19-Feb-98 1129 :141 036-GX55 i 
00=332=393S················TRADOKifE······ ............... ··\63=Oct=97···P·29········ ... 1136 .... -.-.. -. 265::-Cfc3S·········
i 
00-332-3935 lRADOME 04-ijar-98. 129 1133 8040-GK6Q 
00~16-6231 iRUDDER TRIM ACTUATOR 113- 129 1130 8102-GM64 . __ .J 
'60=41-0=623'1 ··········-······TACTUATOR········ .. -...... ................. ···················!22=Sep 7.12:::-::9~_-+-:11c="3-=-8 _-t::8:-::2-::-:64::--'G==L93 
00~14-7817 jPT AFT SHOULDER PANEL 129-Jul-98 129 1136 8209-G6 
'00~15-7985 [RESERVOIR I 18-Jun-98 129 1135 8167-GT32 1 
fd6=41·S=79ss·--·-·-·fRES-ERVofR············ .-.-.- .......................... -.... 2S=Mar~98-·-· ·f29-········-T1·31-·· .. ·-··-- 8081:GC02-···-·-·--1 
100~18-2388 :STBD MLG DOOR 10-Sep-98 ,129 1135 8238-GT50 
100~18-2390 iSLAT ASSY 09-Jun-98 1129 !133 8159-GX39 
iOO~18-2390 [SLAT ASSY 07-Jul-98129 1141 8170-GW35 
:00~19-6152 ,MASTER LIGHTS 14-Sep-98 129 j130 18256-GM93 
iOO~21~628 ,FITTING CONTROL .. ~07-May-98 129 \139 8121-GV47 
iOO~21~667 ,SLAT ASSY . !10-Jun-98 129 1135 8117-GT77 . 
f00=42f4667 ··················isCAT··ASSy .......... -................. ········--1·2s:May=98· 129····-··-1"1·28------·-·· 8089:GP1S-·--·- i 
I 
00~21~667 !PORT OUTBD SLAT j14-May-98 1129 1130 8125-GM21 
:00~21~667 iSLAT ASSY .............. J::=~:p.=~~.J~~_~_. 1138 L8254-GL50 i '00~21 ~667 i SLAfASS·Y ....... -.---... 104-Sep-98 1129··-/1·3S···--1824S-.:GL2S-···-·_··: 
:00-451-6481 iDOOR ASSY 104-Dec-97 \129 :.131 !7328-GN45 
, I ! ! 
iOO~65-2370 INOSE STRUT '--f02-Jun-98""l129 i135 8134-GT09 , 
~ j. ; 
:Ob=4s6=3247 TvRi='CONTROCRAD ······103=F·e6=9S"11'29··----1133-·-··-··-· ·S021-GX57 .. ·-·-i 
!-;;:: 0-;:-0~-==80=---::-:32:-:4:;7--'-;-!V-;;-H;;:F:-;;C;:-::O::-::-N-;;:;T::;:;R:-;:;O:-;-L-;:P~A~N;;:E:;-L-----:l-::-:30=---:;:;:-Se-p--:-9:::-::8=-- i 134 8269-GS03 
00~80-3247 i RADIO CONTROL 127-May-98 ;133 8-GX61 
60=483:1844 ·············SiR:DCAGE·cvDi\iDER ................ ·········T18-De6=97····T128 28f:(3P79-· ... ·· 
f \ . 
00~99~322 VALVE !03-Aug-98 ;141 !8212-GW40 
83 
.. -.-- .. ------ --___ --:-:::-",---.....,..,,-=---==-=--0--
00-501-9874 'SHEAR BOLT ~11-Sep-98 1129135 I 8254-GT32 
06~567=5142 SOLENOID VALVE ;fi=Apr~9a "'129 141 'T8060=<3647 
I 
~~.~~_!_~::.346~___ RP INDICATOR _____________ . ____ .~5-Nov-97 ;129 139 I 7325-GV40 
00-575-3469 RPM IND 15-Jun-98 :129 128 18154-GF58 
~6b=575=34'69 ... . .... 'RPMI NO . "i03~6d~97 . :129- 134 '-[7276=<3S11 
oci=658=320g- - :SENSOR, TEMP 04-Nov-97 :129 133 I 7304-GX49 
~00-758-2539STRIKER PLATE t17-0ct-97 1129 '132 j7289-GP16 
[66=758=8690-- DOOR ASSY:23=Mar-:.981f29142....18076=GC46-- ... 
roo=759-8492' ASN-50 PWR SUPPLY ----:09-Jan-98 i129 :140 18008-GU17 
'00-759-8492 ASN-50 PWR SUPPLY '01-Jul-98 i129 '133 [8181-GX04 
00=803=2767 . fpT ... '!02-0ct-9il129-';134l727S=GS03 
--_._ ... _--------_._ .... _- ---_ ....... _-_ .. -.. __ .. _--.. _- ~ ---'-:-:::-:::-----+, =-=-:-:-::=-:---
00-844-1420 CHECK VALVE :01-Sep-98 :129 128 I 8244-GF31 
. '00-868-4353 FLAP ASSY i09-0ct-97 140 i7282-GU84 
;00-871-0592 TRANSMITIER------i04-Aug-98 :141 18211-GW33 
:oo~885:'1955---- ,HF/RT ARC-105 -·-------j24-Dec-97 7349-GX87 
iOO-880-1955ARC-105 !03-Feb-98 18033-GX35 
"00-905-0844 ,AMP BOX ------i29-Jun-98 [8099-GX49 
00=920=887"a" TOTAL TEMP PROBE:15-J"un-98;13S- --"iHs2:-G-f47"--
00-948-0545 :HEAT SHROUD i25-Aug-98 1129 '134 8236-GS44 
iOO=948-0545 ---- 'SHROUD ASSY ---------;10-Sep-98 1129 .. __ .L1_~~ __ . ____ ~_~~:.~~~~__ i 
:00-9io-3760"iVA[VE-'~:SSY--' . !18=May-98"Tf29 :131 8138-GN58--1 
:00-971-2668 :SHAFT ASSY i13-Jan-98 :129 139 17309-GW12 
00·:"9"71-2£f6-8--- iSHAFT ASSY i02-Jul-98 1129 '141 8163-GW60 I 
................. '.. ..... . __ ~. ... ... . .... : ....... ..... _ .... __ .... __ ._ ... __ ._ ....... L ... H ••••• H ••••• H •• H. __ ._ ••••••• 1 ............ _ ...... _ ... _ ... _._ .. ___ .. H •• _ •• __ ••••• w __ .H •• _ ••• __ W.H •• _._ ..... _ l 
:sEAC-----··----- i28-May-98 129 ,130- 8147-GM95-"i 
i f8-May-98 1 129 :131 18136-GN57 1 ,06-971-3732 iFITIING MOUNT 
iACCELEROMETER '00-984-1084 5-Jun-98 1129 1132 18156-GP75 ! 
·················· .... ··············· .. +·0'2=Feb-9S···"T12~f-- ··11:2s------- S()32:""GF17 .m-l 
iRUDDER :30-Jun-98 1129 :136 18169-G629 :01-021-8686 
'RUDDER ASSY !09-Sep-98 1129 137 18251-G908 01-021-8686 
i12-Aug-98 1129 134 18219-GS04 
.. ·---------·[30-Sep-98 i 129 .134 I 8269-GS99 
:PANELASSY :01-023-3210 
'01-023-3532 rBD 5/6 RCVR 
, 
, 01-023-3532 iBAND 5/6 RCVR j26-Mar-98 !129142 18084-GC41 
~;~:~~~~ -j:;;:C-;~-- ------ i ~:~:;:~H~:- --1~---:-~~! 
:01-023-3533 :BAND 8/9B RCVD J25-Mar-98 :129 :142 18084-GC34 
, ! 
'01-023-3533 BAND 8/9B RECEIVER i20-Feb-98 1129130 [8049-GM10 ,~:~;~~:;- - ':~-~! :~~:- --=---==~~~~::~::t~: ----:-~;--I!~:~~:i 
:01~023-3535------~BAND 4 RCVR -------------;-f6-J~n-9~.)129 :133 J8014-GX03 








(13-Aug-98 1129 :137 I 8224-G941 ' 
:11-Sep-98 ;138 I 8254-GL54 
.. [18~May~98 ........ :132 ........ ····8·1"34=(3·1539···· 
----------·---i03-Feb-98 133 8033-GX36 
84 
'b1~043:'9832- lICS CONTROL BOX T27-Mar-98 1129 i133 18086-GX09 
'b1~043=SS32 'ICS CONTROL BOX '/1a=fiiiar=98 ']129'1'33 """"'IS075=<35(45 
01-043-9832 'ICS CONTROL BOX j28-Apr-98 :129133 /8114-GX33 
01~060-5049--- AIR NAV COMPUTER-------- \25-Sep-98 1129 141 I 8265-GW08 
61=060=5049 . "ANC······ ············!2s=6a=9i'T129 ... ,.,', ..... , ... 'lT39- 298::<3\194----
'01 ~060-5049"--"'lj\Nt 
'01~060-5049 IANC 
'01=06i=8336 ·········,OIL PRESSURE 
i03-Sep-98 1129 '128 !8245-GF42 
------'~,26~-~Ju-n~-9=8-~1=12=9~-~:1=33~~~8=17=7~-G=X=3~1--~ 
i 
01-067-8336 !OIL PRESSURE XMITIER i~~:~~;~8 :~~: :~:~ =~ --
01-076-5204 ,CONTROL PANEL 104-Jun-98 1129 .. l137~~48-G994_, 
61=oii=6886 RADAR SEU:'-STABILIZER"" . Tos=fiiiar=98T129 132 --, 8064'::<3'P40-
01-081-7945 RESERVOIR 125-Mar .. 98 1129 1131 8037-GV95 
'01-085-0348 CONTROL STICK i24-Nov-97 1129 1133 7321-GX75 
'01-089-9044 ,BELLCRANK -----131-0ct-97 1129 '142 7303-GC26 
:01-091-2462 APC COMPUTER 114-Sep-98 1129 1130 8257-GM98 
!01-093-6689 'PORT STABILIZER i10-Sep-98 1129 :130 8253-GM74 
,01-093-6689 :STABILIZER ------Jo6.~~.~~~~~ 129 :141 ~345-GW72 i 
'61=09i::f2'fs""'\!ALVEli'NEA'Ff' ",., . 07 -Jul-98 129 i 128 -"----"'181i'7=-GF09-··---" 
'01-138-8596 :STINGER I 13-Jan-98 129 :142 8008-GC10 
~~~~--~~~~~------~,-~[~~~~~~-+.~---+.==~==~~ >~~~~~~~~~~~ ,i~~~,~I~~,-, -, i~~~~~,~~~~~,~,~-,-.+~~~,--,.-- ~~~~~~~~---,-< 
:01-139-7385 ,PHD i07-May-98 1129 '131 8126-GN02 
01-145-2528 iDUCT ASSEMBLY I 17-Feb-98 1129 1139 8043-GV20 
61='1'45=2528 ······"'·····i5Ucr-ASSY """""'-- ················j21::sep::s8-112-g-"Tf40···, 825'f=GuOEf' -----, 
:01-145-2528 :DUCT ASSY !14-Sep-98 1129 1137 8251-G915 
:01-145-2528 IDUCT ASSY 111-Aug-98 1129 :134 8222-GS09 
f01::145=2528 ·····,·····"TDUcf-ASSy----'- ····,',·····,·········'i06=Mar:::ss' ]129----' --]''1''33·--------- B064-GX51---·-------j 
'01-145-2528 :DUCT ASSY !11-Sep-98 1129 1130 B251-GM58 
:01-145-2B25 :DUCT ASSY 12B-May-9B 1129 1130 8147-GM93 
:01-147-309B :BDHI 116-Jun-98 129 ,130 8166-GM29 
'01-190-6309 ITRANSFORMER 124-Jun-98 1129 1128 8124-GF49 
:01-192-2913 iLADDER LIGHT ASSY \11-Feb-9B 129 :140 8037-GU79 
1,. ~1 -_21 0965-_930920:"7 vE.N'I~C----O------D.--E .. --R.--.. A.--.S'---S---Y-,--'",_ """""""""""',., ... , ..... ,.".,"""""'""""12~14'~--SF--'-e~'b~-~9~'B~-.TJ11---2~,99'.- ! 138 8254-GL57 I v"-Tf42 '-"' 804 7 -GC20-··----1 
:01-205-3007 ENCODER 111-Sep-98 1129 1138 8254-GL51 
:01-205-3007 ENCODER ASSY I03-Feb-98 1129 1133 8032-GX28 
:61=205'=300i Ei~ico-bER ASSY '" "!24::JuI=98'T129- '-·j1'4-r---'·'-yS202--=-GVVOr------" 
'01-20B-5389 BEARING 126-Jan-98 1129, ,135 !8022-GT30 
[01-242-37BB DDI IOB-Jan-98 i129 ,140 j7352-GU21 : 
~b1::242=6450 123 COMPUTER "······,·····,···""j29=J'uj::98, Tf2~f'·'Tf2'8 "',- '8210:'GF4-if --., 
01-259-6607 iATIENUATOR 130 7308-GM73 





, _________ , ___ , _____ ,-'---_____________ -'--___ ---1.-__ -'------'----------' 
85 
----l29-Apr-98 1129 133 j8119-GX57 
';16=Mar=9s 1129-132-- ...... 1-8672=GP02 1 
18167-GF41 
, 01-283-6735 IPI 17-Jun-98 i129 i 128 
01=2S4-5165-----:STBD STASfLlZER-------- i24-Dec-97 :129 128 17356-GF58 
~~=-~3=7~5~__BELLCRANK ___________;21-Sep=9ar129--135IS25~f:GT3f .. 
'21-Apr-98 1129 135 18104-GT18 01-319-5462 iCSD EJECTOR 
'OT=31-9-5462- .--- iCSD EJECTOR , ---, -----------;-30-Jul-98 ;129 141 8201-GW79 
., .... " ... ,-----,_ .. _--- ... " ............. ! 











.. -----;26-Nov-97 : 129 












101-337-4691 iAYK-14 !08-Jan-98 1129 '140 06-GU91 
i01-337-4691 iAYK-14 i24-Mar-98 1129 :133 8082-GX87 ! 
. i l ...................... i i61=342=5845- ... rFUELSY~fR-EIAY'BOX .- · .. ·'--!25=Jun=9s -1129 ·--H35"---- .. ltf1'7S:-Gf-1-6 ' 
!01-342-5845 'RELAY ASSY !11-Jun-98 i129 1128 18161-GF25 
:01-342-5876 ; RELAY ASSY i24-Aug-98 1129 i141 8230-GW48 i 
[01=342=5S76 ., '-'-iRELAY-S'oi( ... . ...................... 'i2S=Aug-=98 "11'29--- '-:-1-31------ 'Sf40:GNS-S--'''') 
~01:350-4548-- 'SCREW CLOSE !07-Jul-98 , 1129 i141 , 8170-GW~7 
[01:356-1662 :PRC VANE CONTROL :22-JUI-98j1~~ j128 8202-GF09 
IcH=360=3759 . "CONTROLiNbTcAfoR ... , .. ·····T02-:Apr:9a 129 1128-' SCf90=GF6Ef'l 
!01-360-3759 iCONTROL INDICATOR l03-Apr-98 '129 1128 18093-GF75 . 
101-360-8238 ~GPS IRU i21-Apr-98 1129 1132 8105-GP92 ".,j 
[01:3~ia:0438- .. -IVAL\iE-ASSY-----·-·· ...... ,.... ..- .... ---- . i16=Jun:g-a-112~f' -~12'8' ""la1't!i6=GF-36- 1 
101-415-5770 iEFIS CONTROL 123-Apr-98 1129 '135 18112-GT47 
01-415-5770 IEFIS CONTROL PANEL !20-Aug-98 1129 141 8222-GW75 
:01-415-5770 rEFIS CONTROL PANEL --[n-Jul-98 [129 1141 8198-GW65 
!(Ff~15-57iO--'- - :EFIS CONTROL PANEL 124-Aug-98 1129 :141 18224-GL55 
101-415-5770 :EFIS CONTROL PANEL i20-Aug-98 :129 :141 I 8232-GW54 
~b1-415-5779--- 'EADI ---.-------- !21-May-98 i129 :141 J8141-GW01 i 
101=41'5=5779- .. 'TEAOf"- ..... ""-124:Sep=98T1-2~f- .. ··1"141 .. '----' IS263:GVV69--"-j 
101-415-5779 iEFIS INDICATOR !06-May-98 1129 1141 18119-GW03 
!01-415-5779 iEADI :07-Jul-98 !129 !138 18182-GL65 
:01=415=5779 ······"·';EAof'-- . "'j09-Jul-98 [129 , ... ":1'3-3 ""-lsf87=GX9f" .': 
~?~5-5779 'EADI :13-Aug-98 1129 '137 18222-G921 
'01-415-5779 :EFIS INDICATOR :21-Apr-98 1129 1135 j8098-GT79 








11-May-98 1129 1141 18128-GW55 
16-Mar-98 :129 1130 18071-GM42 
11-Aug-98 i129"··T141·······"TS2'n-:GW28 
13-Aug-98 1129 '137 I 8222-G920 
, 
'01-415-8947 !DATABASE COUPLER -25-Mar-98 1129 1142 7324-GC65 
01-433-3387TACOUsffc"SEACoN 02-Sep-98 i 12'~f'''''1'3r 
~ ______ ~~ __ ~~'~~~~ __ -+.~~~~~ 
lMISC CONTROL BOX i22-Sep-98 1129 :133 '01-437-4579 
;01447-5993' !BD 10 AMP 
--:--~ .'------'-:--=-=:---' 
--"-"---""103-Aug-98 !129 1128 
..... ···········!28=Ap·r=9Sj12'9 ··················1133" 
138 
17-760-151 . VALVE, TANK 
:CS-401-7215 iSKIN ASSY 
J52'=P=4'08A' iENGINE 
iJ52-P408A ENGINE 
;COUPLING ASSY j10-Sep-98 
TEMP CONTROL PANEL I 28-Apr-98 
'LL-BHW-7909 
:LL-CRG-M600 
ILL-CRG-M600 !AFT EQUIP OVERTEMP CONTL i'11 R.8-JiA;;;ug;;:-0i9 ~1?cr--r1ru--tmn::r.::Bir--
, I VALVE . I 
lCABLEASSY --------~!~2~0-~Ja-n~-9~8~~~~~---+.==~~~~ ILL-TA1-6874 129 1133 8020-GX38 
..................... l ........................ " ......... _ ....... .. j .... " 
1133 
• ••••• "N •• • •• 
,129 I LL-TA 1-6S75"lcABCE"'ASSY !20-Jan-98 
-------~~~~~~--+=~--+=~==~~ LL-TA1-6875 !RF CABLE 125-Mar-98 
"j'S020=-GX40-"" 
! 
129 1128 8083-GF35 
!LL-TA1-6875 
!LL-TA1-6876 
iRF CABLE ------~~~~~~--~~--~~~~~ !25-Mar-98 
1 








.LL-TA1-6S78 TCASIE"ASSY .. 
!20-Jan-98 
25-Mar-98 
iLL-TA 1-6878 1 RF CABLE ------........; 
'LL-TA1-6879 iCABLE ASSY 



















·· .. · .. lf28 
····SOS"3·:GF-3"if 
88 
APPENDIX C. COMNAV AIRP AC FY-98 DEGRADER LISTS 
Nomenclature NIIN Nomenclature NIIN 
REPAIRABLES: 
Port MLG Gear 00-132-3170 AYK14 01-337-4691 
STBD MLG Door 00-132-3178 Slat Assembly 00-412-4667 
EADI 01-415-5779 Radome 01-449-0721 
Port OUTBD Slat 00-421-4667 Valve, Fuel 00-919-0759 
STBD INBD Slat 00-163-1962 Tape Cartridge 01-206-1842 
STBD OUTBD Slat 00-418-2390 Slat Assembly 00-418-2390 
Engine J52-P-408A Stabilizer 00-109-6231 
Nav Control 01-320-0540 Radome 00-332-3935 
Digital Coupler 01-415-8947 Cylinder Assembly 00-006-0439 
Air Nav Computer . 01-060-5049 Valve, Wing Tank 00-077-2864 
RPM Indicator 00-575-3469 Canopy Aft 00-205-2253 
Rudder 01-021-8686 Canopy Fwd 00-402-8651 
Antenna 01-028-8804 Stabilizer 01-093-6689 
ARC Relay 01-342-5876 Stabilizer 01-093-6691 
Valve Assembly 00-021-7145 Dampner 00-152-2655 
COMBNR Radio 00-060-5891 Dampner 00-970-6672 
APC Amp 00-106-9554 ReservOir, Hydraulic 01-081-7945 
LO Amplifier 01-447-5993 Flap,OUTBD 00-868-4351 
Fuel Transmitter 00-871-0592 Flap Assembly 00-868-4353 
Relay 01-299-7150 Stabilizer 01-284-5165 
Nose Strut 00-465-2370 Flaperon 01-089-2223 
Strut, Main land. Gear 00-103-4450 Stick Control 01-085-0348 
Brake Assembly 00-152-2743 Turbine 00-010-7252 
Sector Front 01-447-4558 Birdcage 00-483-1844 
EFIS Controller 01-415-5770 Starter 00-038-1172 
CONSUMABLES: 
Fairing 01-323-3337 Nut, Sleeve 00-603-0447 
Shaft Assembly 00-971-2668 Pigtail 00-169-5547 
CSD Ejector 01-319-5462 Inclinometer 01-415-5775 
Screw 01-350-4548 Antenna 01-259-6559 
Accelerometer 00-984-1028 Footrest Assembly 00-243-4662 
Pi'n 00-238-7051 Amplifier 00-905-0844 
Insulation Blanket 01-272-8419 Packing 00-122-5723 
Hose Assembly 00-163-5829 Stinger 01-138-8596 
Fuel Probe 00-432-2894 Antenna 01-174-0622 
Switch 00-083-1485 Float Switch 00-150-6471 
Shroud 00-948-0545 Cable 00-617-9291 
Connector 01-415-5776 Handle 99-253-0780 
Canopy Seal 00-403-3082 AlC Shield 01-024-8803 , 
Printed Wire 00-489-0665 Interior Light 00-232-7914 
Temp. Sensor 01-027-8878 Cable Assembly 00-760-5726 




























































APPENDIX D. NADEP JACKSONVILLE EA·6B CANNIBALIZATION LIST BY ACCENDING NOMENCLATURE UPDATED 9/23/98 
NOMEN PiN NIN DOC QTY SQD USER STATUS USER REMARKS NADEP STATUS 
BLEED AIR DUCT 1128EC41127-3 00-232-8044 V09114-6075-G707 M14 R/O 7133 -G720' N A 
BRACKET, RH 1128KN40516-12 LL-CRG-3322 NOO620-6156-GK41 1 129 N A 
CYLINDER ASSY 1128H40053-3 00-421-7732 NOO620-6163-GX96 1 133 CNX SUPPLY FILLED NA 
DOOR ASSY 00-202-7029 N65886-6243-20Q7 NFK NA 
FAIRING ASSY 1128AV43184-1 01-193-38'12 N65886-6243-23Q9 NFK NA 
FLAP SWITCH BOX D504M5 00-068-1557 NOO620-6263-GU31 1 140 CNX BY CVWP SUPPLY FILLED NA 
LOX QTY IND 1128SCAV698-1 00-150-6986 N00620-6213-GW04 1 141 RCVD N A 
MLG FWD DOOR UP,RH 1128B40900-24 00-132-3178 V03365-6250-G849 0 N A 
MOTOR ALTERNATING 128SCAMI00-213 00-181-9556 NOO620-6220-GK62 1 129 SUPPLY FILLED N A 
TAILPIPE, (WRONG LH) 1128P41500-51 00-109-5787 NOO620-6085-GT62 1 135 R/O 6309-GT6B RCVBD 06/05/97 
CAC 142140-01-01 00-906-0598 V09114-7127-G782 1 M14 RCVD 08-18-97 
FUEL DUMP VALVE N00620-8165-GK31 1 129 RCVD 24JUN98 
PANEL ASSY 1128AV43218-1 01-366-3121 NOO620-6142-GN55 1 131 CNX R 0 6309-BK74 RCVD 01 22 97 
FLAP ASSY OUTBD RH 128CSI0006-8 00-868-4353 NOO620-6282-GU05 1 140 R 0 7293-BK84 RCVD 02 18 98 I 
SLAT ASSY INBD, RH 1128CSI0009-22 00-163-1962 NOO620-6240-GU72 1 140 RCVD 09/27/96 R 0 7293-BK85 RCVD 02 18 98 
MOTOR ALTERNATING 58425-2 00-181-9556 N00620-7225-GS63 1 W R 0 7336-BK75 RCVD 03 09 98 
MOTOR ALTERNATING 58425-2 00-181-9556 N00620-7226-GS70 1 W R 0 7260-GM68 RCVD 03 09 98 
LOX QTY IND 1128SCAV698-1 00-150-6986 R09112-6212-GG60 1 134 CNX R/O 6291-BK86 RCVD 03 10 97 
TAILPIPE RH 1128P41500-52 00-109-5766 NOO620-6039-GWI9 1 141 CNX R/O 6260-GK02 RCVD 03 10 97 
TAILPIPE RH 1128P41500-52 00-109-5766 NOO620-6093-GX32 1 133 CNX R/O 6116-GK65 RCVD 03 10 97 
CONVERTER,DSDC EFIS 53-020-03 99-371-0380 N00620-7154-GV08 1 W TRANSFER DOC N00620-7101-GL41 RCVD 03 11 98 
RADOME NOSE 1128B40005-19 00-332-3935 N00620-7113-G937 1 129 RCVD 06/16/97 RCVD 03 11 98 
RADOME NOSE 1128B40005-19 00-332-3935 N00620-7176-GT79 1 W RCVD 03 27 98 
SLAT ASSY INBD RH 1128CSI0009-22 00-163-1962 NOO620-6123-GK42 1 129 CNX R/O 6309-BK73 RCVD 03 27 98 
MASTER CAUTION LITE L20050803AC' 00-418-6223 V09114-7210-G762 1 M14 RCVD 04 06 98 
PRESS. REG. DEFOG D76C13 00-152-2661 V09114-6130-G941 M14 RCVD 04 08 97 
MLG UPLOCK CYLINDER 1128H40058-3 00-421-4542 V09114-6144-G963 M14 RCVD 04 10 97 
PRESS. REG. DEFOG D76C13 00-152-2661 V09114-6133-G944 M14 RCVD 04 10 97 
LOX OTY IND 1128SCAV698-1 00-150-6986 NOO620-6200-GKOI 1 129 CNX R/O 6107-BK72 RCVD 04 14 97 
SLAT ASSY INBD RH 1128CS10009-22 00-163-1962 N0620-8090-GT27 1 VAQ RCVD 04 17 98 
ACTUATOR MECH 128SCAMI01-353 00-570-6196 NOO620-6275-GX35 1 133 RCVD 04 24 97 
DRAG LINK NLG 1128LM40204-1 00-419-4390 NOO620-6351-GK52 1 129 RCVD 7085 RCVD 05 05 97 
CSD EJECTOR 1128P41538-5 01-319-5462 NOO620-6162-GK40 1 129 RCVD 05 06 97 
RELAY ASSY 1128AV43193-23 01-342-5876 NOO620-7016-G916 1 140 NOT RCVD RCVD 05 06 97 
SWITCH 10800GN3-8 01-254-2148 NOO620-6299-GK28 1 129 SUPPLY FILLED RCVD 05 12 97 I 
VALVE SPECIAL IFA01003-1 00-169-0535 NOO620-6169-GX06 1 133 CNX R/O 6134-GX09 RCVD 05 13 97 
DRAG BRACE NOSE 1706-73 00-409-6755 NOO620-6339-GN65 1 131 RCVD RCVD 05 16 97 
BOLT SHOULDER 1706-221 00-434-6666 NOO620-7030-GN24 1 129 RCVD RCVD 05 20 97 
BOLT SHOULDER 1706-221 00-434-6666 NOO620-7038-GN28 1 131 CNX R/O 7045-GN99 RCVD 05 20 97 
CADT 204820 00-444-3325 NOO620-6128-GKI3 1 129 RCVD 05 20 97 
CANOPY ACT FWD 1128N40050-5 00-006-0440 NOO620-6064-GK48 1 129 RCVD RCVD 05 20 97 
CRANK ASSY, LH 128LI0033-3 01-293-7659 N00620-6346-GK21 1 129 RCVD' RCVD 05 20 97 




CRANK ASSY LH 128L10033 3 
CRANK ASSY, LH 128L10033-3 
DRAG LINK 1706-95 
DRAG LINK 1706-88 
PIVOT PIN 1706-245 
SENSING UNIT 027 - 04 7 - 014 
FLAP ASSY OUTBD LH 128CS10006-7 
CANOPY ACT AFT 1128N40051-7 
FLAP ASSY OUTBD LH 128CS10006-7 
FLAP ABSY OUTBD LH 128CS10006-5 
MLG FWD DOOR UP LH 1128B40900-23 
MLG FWD DOOR UP LH 1128B40900-23 
MLG FWD DOOR UP L/H 1128B40900 - 23 
MLG FWD DOOR UP RH 1128M40900-24 
FLAP ASSY OUTBD RH 128CS10006-7 
TAILPIPE LH 1128P41500-51 
LANDING GEAR HANDLE 1128AV43077-3 
MISSION COMPUTER 13213591- 02 
ACCELEROMETER TRANS 615794-4 
SLAT TRACK INBD R/H 1128CSM46500-11 
DAMPER ASSY 25-015 
RADIO COMBINER 265537-2 
CRANK ASSY LH 128L10033-3 
EFIS CONTROL PANEL 071-01439-3300 
FITTING 128BM10975-1 
NLG UPLOCK FITTING 1128BM42007-1 
MLG FWD DOOR UP, R/H 1128B40900-24 
FLAP ASSY OUTBD RH 128CS10006-8 
MLG ASSY RH 1707800-2 
MLG FWD DOOR UP LH 1128B40900-23 
MLG FWD DOOR UP LH 1128B40900-23 
MOTOR ALTERNATING 58425-2 
NLG DOOR ASSY LH 128B11405- 3 
SCREW CLOSE 1128CSM46504-11 
EGT ·IND 1128SCAV832-9 
SWITCH 4451-1 
RADOME ASSY 1128B40005-19 
CAnT 204820 
VALVE ASSY PNEUMATIC 35980-7 
CRANK ASSY LH 128LI0033-3 
AMMETER 20337-2B 
FUEL FLOW IND 1128SCVA831-9 
INSULATION LINE 1128EC40161-5 
TAILPIPE LH 1128P41500-51 
PITOT STATIC 856CD4 














































DOC QTY SQD USER STATUS USER REMARKS NADEP STATUS 
NOO620-7034-G227 1 RCVD RCVD 05 20 97 
R09112-7038-G289 1 133 RCVD RCVD 05 20 97 
NOO620-7038-GN29 1 131 RCVD 7057 RCVD 05 20 97 
NOO620-7038-GN27 1 131 RCVD 7057 RCVD 05 20 97 
NOO620-7038-GN31 1 131 RCVD 7057 RIo 7154-BK82 RCVD 05 30 97 
NOO620-6284-GK54 1 129 RCVD RCVD 05 30 97 
NOO620-6242-GT45 1 135 CNX RIo 7079-BK57 RCVD 06 02 97 
NOO620-6180-GK18 1 129 RCVD RIo 7133-BK81 RCVD 06 04 97 
NOO620-6282-GU06 1 140 RCVD 06 08 97 
NOO620-6358-GN43 1 131 RCVD CHG 6143-GK25 RCVD 06 13 97 
V03365-6229-G840 Q V03369 RIo 8191-GX52 RCVD 07 23 98 
V03365-6230-G855 0 RiO 7036-3U07 RCVD 08 03 98 
V03365-6230-G855 1 M14 RCVD 08 03 98 
V03365-6259-G823 Q RiO 8034-G967 RCVD 08 03 98 
NOO620-6199-GK36 1 129 RCVD 08 07 97 
NOO620-6113-GS36 1 134 RCVD 08 07 97 
NOO620-6185-GX50 1 133 RCVD RiO 7135-BK52 RCVD 08 20 98 
V09114-7282-G981 1 M14 RCVD 08 20 98 
NOO620-7029-GN06 1 131 RCVD 03/03/97 RiO 7133-BK85 RCVD 08 21 97 
N00620-7185-GP41 1 132 RCVD 08/11/97 RCVD 08 28 97 
N00620-7325-GK12 1 VAQ RCVD 08 31 98 
N00620-8144-GK53 1 VAQ RCVD 08 31 98 
NOO620-7017-GK12 1 129 RCVD RCVD 09 09 97 
N00620-8224-GL55 1 VAQ RCVD 09 09 98 
N00620-8181-BK54 1 VAQ RCVD 09 09 98 
N00620-8197-GN42 1 VAQ MD SOURCE CODED NEED TO BE MANUFA RCVD 09 09 98 
V09114-7091-G142 1 M14 RCVD 09 10 98 
R03364-7225-GT90 1 131 RCVD 09/12 97 
N00620-7212-GS80 1 134 RCVD 09/22/97 
NOO620-6250-GX71 1 133 RCVD RCVD 1/24/1997 
R03364-7236-G542 1 131 RCVD 10 15/97 
N00620-7117-GK21 1 W RIo 7258 -GS48 RCVD 10 16/97 
N00620-6219-GK24 1 129 RCVD RCVD 10 2/1996 
NOO620-6057-GS98 1 134 RCVD NA RCVD 10 28 1996 
R09112-6193-GG74 1 134 RCVD NA RCVD 11 04 1996 
NOO620-6299-GK27 1 129 SUPPLY FILLED RCVD 11 04 96 
N00620-6339-GN74 1 131 RCVD 02/04/97 RCVD 11 06 97 
NOO620-6115-GK02 1 129 NA RCVD 11 08 1996 
NOO620-6122-GS88 1 134 CNX RIo 6253-GU12 RCVD 11 08 96 
N00620-6252-GK38 1 129 RCVD NA RCVD 11 12 1996 
NOO620-6071-GK27 1 129 NOT RCVD NA RCVD 11 4 1996 
R09112-6212-GG59 1 134 RCVD NA RCVD 11 4 1996 
NOO620-6024-GK06 1 129 RCVD NA RCVD 11/4 1996 
NOO620-6093-GK30 1 129 NA RCVD 11/4 1996 
NOO620-6079-GM39 1 130 RCVD 
-------




DIFF. PRESS. SENSOR 107406-1-1 
MLG FWD DOOR, UP, LH 1128B40900-23 
ENG HEAT SHROUD 128PI0449-2 
ROD ASSY 1128L40507-1 
CANOPY ACT FWD 1128N40050-5 
COVER ACCESS 128B11550-4 
TAILPIPE RH 1128P41500-52 
TAILPIPE RH 1128P41500-52 
TAILPIPE RH 1128P41500-52 
ACTUATOR APC SLZ9297-1 
ACTUATOR APC SLZ9297-1 
FLAP SWITCH BOX D504M5 
LIGHT SPECIAL 65-0420-9 
PRESS REG DEFOG D76C13 
PRESS REG DEFOG D76C13 
VALVE ASSY 555123-3 
VALVE ASSY PANEL 1128AV43026-3 
PRESS. REG. DEFOG D76C13 
MLG FWD DOOR UP RH 1128B40900-24 
MLG FWD DOOR, UP, LH 1128B40900-23 
TAILPIPE RH 1128P41500-52 
MLG FWD DOOR UP, RH 1128B40900 - 24 
PITOT PROBE 856CD3 
RADOME, NOSE 1128B40005-19 
DIFF. PRESS. SENSOR 107406-1-1 
DEFOG PANEL 1128AV43097-5 
PRESS REG DEFOG D76C13 
DUCT 1128EC40147-13 
CANOPY ACT AFT 1128N40051-7 
MLG RECYCLE VALVE 1128SCH600-1 
VALVE ASSY PNEUMATIC 35980-7 
WHITE HOUSE ASSY 1128P41505-7 
CANOPY ACT FWD 1128N40050-3 
WHITE HOUSE ASSY 1128P41505-7 
WHITE HOUSE ASSY 1128P41505-7 
WHITE HOUSE ASSY 1128P41505-7 
FLAP ASSY OUTBD RH 128CS10006-8 
DIFF. PRESS. SENSOR 107406-1-1 
WHITE HOUSE ASSY L45600 
ACCELEROMETER TRANS 615794-4 
ACCELEROMETER TRANS 615794-4 
FITTING 128BM10975-1 
MLG FWD DOOR, UP LH 1128B40900-23 
MLG FWD DOOR UP R/H 1128B40900-24 
r.tLG FWD DOOR UP R/H 1128B40900-24 














































DOC QTY SQD USER STATUS USER REMARKS NADEP STATUS 
NOO620-6120-GK24 1 129 CNX RIo 6304-BK68 RCVD 12/04/96 
NOO620-6148-GX46 1 133 RCVD R/O 7153-BK81 RCVD 12/08/97 
V09114-6247-GI59 M14 RCVD 12/13/96 
NOO620-6156-GK32 1 129 RCVD NA RCVD 2 18 1997 
NOO620-6179-GX39 1 133 RCVD NA RCVD 2 28 1997 
NOO620-6029-GP33 1 132 RCVD NA RCVD 2 28 1997 
NOO620-6116-GK65 1 133 NA RCVD 3 10 1997 
NOO620-6260-GK02 1 141 NA RCVD 3 10 1997 
NOO620-6113-GW57 1 141 NA RCVD 3/11 1997 
NOO620-6267-GNOI 1 131 NA RCVD 4/14 1997 
R09112-6253-GG39 1 134 NA RCVD 4/14 1997 
NOO620-6124-GKII 1 129 NA RCVD 4. 14 1997 
. NOO620-6291-GK50 1 129 NA RCVD 4 14 1997 
NOO620-6166-GK07 1 129 NA RCVD 4 14 1997 
NOO620-6343-GN91 1 131 RCVD NA RCVD 4 14 1997 
N00620-6281-GK60 1 129 NA RCVD 4 14 1997 
NOO620-6278-GK28 1 129 RCVD 5-12-97 
V09114-6144-GI54 M14 RCVD 7098 
V09114-5356-G719 M14 RCVD 96337 
V09114-7071-G963 M14 RCVD 97097 
V09114-5311-G482 M14 R/O 6011-G046 RCVD 97102 
NOO620-6135-GT03 1 135 CNX RIO 6263-GT40 RCVD04/24/97 
V09114-5356-G131 M14 RCVD97133 
NOO620-6326-GX98 1 133 RECD 8-26-97 
NOO620-6109-GK41 1 129 SHIPPED 01 08/97 
N00620-6171-GK11 1 129 RCVD RIO 7133-BK82 SHIPPED 04 20/97 
NOO620-5318-GK35 1 129 RCVD SHIPPED 05 13197 
NOO620-6045-GK44 1 129 CNX RIO 6309-BK75 SHIPPED 12 1Q[96 
V09114-6161-G964 M14 SHIPPED 12 13/96 
NOO620-6103-GP40 1 132 R/O 7133-BK84 SHIPPED 6156 
NOO620-6135-GK14 1 129 RIO 7133-BK86 SHIPPED 6215 
NOO620-6305-BK71 1 134 SHIPPED 7086 
NOO620-6137-GX22 1 133 SHIPPED 8/7/96 
NOO620-6094-GS06 1 134 CNX RIO 6305-BK72 SHIPPED NBZ 6318 
NOO620-6094-GS07 1 134 CNX R/O 6305-BK71 SHIPPED NBZ 7086 
NOO620-6060-GN61 1 131 CNX RIO 7050-BK53 SHIPPED NBZ 7089 
NOO620-6199-GK28 1 129 RCVD SHIPPED NBZ 7211 
NOO620-6292~G936 1 RCVD R/O 7133-BK88 SHIPPED06/01/97 
NOO620-5348-GS09 1 134 RCVD RIo 7133-BK87 SHIPPED6184 
N00620-7315-GU14 1 
v21847-8112-G899 1 140 
N00620-8181-BK53 1 VAQ 
V21847-8095-G889 1 
V21847-8095-G890 1 140 RCVD 
V21847-8130-G895 1 140 
NOMEN PIN NIN DOC QTY SQD USER STATUS USER REMARKS NADEP STATUS 
MLG FWD DOOR UP, L/H 1128N40900-23 00-132-3170 V03369-8191-GX52 1 ENT 
MLG FWD DOOR, UP L/H 1128B40900-23 00-132-3170 V03369-8232-GX31 1 VAQ 
MLG FWD DOOR, UP LH 1128B40900-23 00-132-3170 V03365-6198-G826 0 SURVIED 
MLG FWD DOOR, UP LH 1128B40900-23 00-132-3170 N00620-8210-GK58 1 VAQ 
MLG FWD DOOR, UP RH 1128B40900-24 00-132-3178 NOO620-6267-GN48 1 131 CNX BY CVWP RIo 7113-GS56 
MLG FWD DOOR UP, RH 1128B40900-24 00-132-3178 N0620-7344-BK89 1 VAQ 
MLG FWD DOOR UP L/H 1128B4 0900- 23 00-132-3170 V09114-7036-G125 1 MAL 
MLG FWD DOOR UP LH 1128B40900-23 00-132-3170 N00620-7217-GS91 1 134 R,O 7225-GS67 
MLG FWD DOOR UP,LH 1128B40900-23 00-132-3170 N00166-8063-G181 1 RES 
MLG FWD DOOR UP RH 1128B40900-24 00-132-3178 N00620_8207-GK05 1 VAQ 
NLG DOOR ASSY LH 128B11410-7 00-921-8539 N00620-7217-GS12 1 134 Rio 7225-GS68 
NLG STRUT 1706AOOA 00-465-2370 V03365-8212-G883 1 IKE 
NLG STRUT 1706AOOA 00-465-2370 N00620-8239-GT61 1 VAQ 
NLG UPLOCK SHAFT 128L10008-1 00-971-2668 V03369-8196-GX78 1 IKE 
NLG UPLOCK SHAFT 128L10008-1 00-971-2668 N00620-8206-BK59 1 VAO 
NLG UPLOCK SHAFT 128L10008-1 00-971-2668 N00620-8189-GK59 1 VAQ 
TRIP LINK L H 1128LM40607-11 00-445-5167 V09114-8195-G912 1 M14 BEING REPAIRED BY MACHINISTS 
TRIP LINK L H 1128LM40607-11 00-445-5167 V09114-8195-G914 1 M14 BEING REPAIRED BY MACHINISTS 
TRIP LINK L H 1128LM40607-11 00-445-5167 V09114-8195-G920 1 M14 BEING REPAIRED BY MACHINISTS 
TRIP LINK L H 1128LM40607-11 00-445-5167 V03369-8193-GX59 1 IKE BEING REPAIRED BY MACHINISTS 
TRIP LINK L H 1128LM40607-11 00-445-5167 V03369-????-???? 1 IKE BEING REPAIRED BY MACHINISTS 
'f TRIP LINK R H 1128LM40607-12 00-445-5168 V09114-8195-G910 1 M14 BEING REPAIRED BY MACHINISTS TRIP LINK R H 1128LM40607-12 00-445-5168 V09114-8195-G913 1 M14 BEING REPAIRED BY MACHINISTS 
TRIP LINK R H 1128LM40607-12 00-445-5168 V09114-8195-G916 1 M14 BEING REPAIRED BY MACHINISTS 
TRIP LINK R H 1128LM40607-12 00-445-5168 V03369-8193-GX60 1 IKE BEING REPAIRED BY MACHINISTS 
VALVE ASSY 555123-3 00-021-7145 
-
NQ06AO~7294-GC14 1 VAO 
----
Source: NAVAIR NAMSO Report 704901 
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